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This dissertation contains two essays in labor economics. It provides a descrip-
tive analysis on income volatility and develops a microeconomic model to study how
married couples make joint decisions in response to such income volatility.
The first essay examines the recent trends in household income volatility in the
United States, West Germany and Great Britain, and compares household income
volatility with individual income volatility. I estimate a formal error components
model using the Cross-national Equivalence File from 1979 to 2004. I find that
household income volatility, measured by the transitory variance of household income,
accounts for more than half of the total income variance for all three countries. Despite
the differences in the total household income variances among the three countries, the
permanent variances converges since the late 1990s. The household earnings volatility
is always lower than the individual earnings volatility for married couples, which
suggests some evidence of intra-household insurance.
In the second essay I examine whether married couples make joint labor supply
decisions in response to each other’s wage shocks. The study of this question aids in
understanding the link between the recent rise in earnings volatility and household
joint decisions. I develop an intra-household insurance model based on the collective
framework, which allows for insurance against both permanent and transitory wage
shocks from both partners. Estimation using Survey of Income and Program Partic-
ipation shows that individuals increase labor supply in response to spouse’s adverse
wage shocks and such labor supply responses are larger when shocks are permanent
than transitory. A household makes less transfer to the individual with more volatile
income, which can be considered as a price for insurance.This intra-household insur-
ance reduces earnings volatility by about 1.2% to 7.7%. These results suggest that
joint labor supply decisions provide a smoothing effect on shocks to earnings and
household income.
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Chapter 1
Recent Trends in Household
Income Dynamics for the United
States, Germany and Great Britain
1.1 Introduction
Rising inequality in individual earnings and household income has been an impor-
tant economic feature in the United States over the past several decades as well as
in many other advanced industrial countries (Levy and Murnane, 1992; Gottschalk
and Smeeding, 1997). Such an increase in the cross-sectional income inequality could
arise either from an increase in the dispersion of permanent income, or a larger income
fluctuations from year to year (income volatility). In this paper I apply a formal error
components model to examine the following questions: How much of the household
income inequality reflect income volatility rather than the dispersion of permanent
income and how has this changed over time? How does household income volatil-
ity differ from individual income volatility? Are these trends in the United States
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different from other advanced industrial countries?
It is important to distinguish between the dispersion in permanent income
and income volatility to understand the causes of the growing cross-sectional income
inequality. For labor earnings dynamics, rising dispersion in permanent income is
usually attributable to a skill-biased technological change or trade increase with de-
veloping countries (Katz and Autor, 1999), while rising earnings volatility are more
related to the instability of the labor market (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2002). For
household income dynamics, permanent income dispersion and income volatility may
be attributable to many other economic and social factors because they involve income
sources and joint decisions of more than one person. The causes of the dispersion
in permanent household income may also be affected by marital sorting. If higher
educated women become more likely to marry higher educated men, this could en-
large the income gap between rich and poor households. The causes of household
income volatility, on the other hand, are subject to changes in family structure and
joint decisions (household labor supply, joint job search, family formation and disso-
lution, etc.) of household members. For instance, the “added worker effect” literature
(Lundberg, 1985; Stephens, 2002; Juhn and Potter, 2007) have found that married
women are more likely to participate in the labor market when their husbands become
temporarily unemployed. Such intra-household insurance could reduce household in-
come volatility. On the other hand, changes in family structure, such as the recent
increase in cohabitation and divorce, a decline in first age at marriage (Stevenson and
Wolfers, 2007) would probably increase household income volatility. The descriptive
analysis of the trends in household income dynamics with a comparison in individual
income dynamics is an important initial step to understand the causes of permanent
income dispersion and income volatility.
Although most studies of income inequality implicitly focus on explaining the
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permanent income dispersion, recent studies have found that earnings volatility plays
an important role in explaining the rising cross-sectional income inequality. Ear-
lier work by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) decompose the cross-sectional earnings
variance into a permanent and a transitory component. They find that the income
volatility, using the classical definition of the variance for a transitory component
of earnings, accounts for about one third to one half of the total variance of male
earnings and such transitory variance also has increased over time. Male earnings
dynamics have been well studied in the United States (Haider, 2001; Moffitt and
Gottschalk 2002, 2008, among many others). These studies have shown that earn-
ings volatility increased substantially in the 1980s and then remained at this new
higher level through 2004. Permanent earnings dispersion also increased over time
and accelerate its increase in the early 2000s.
There are fewer studies on household income dynamics (Hacker, 2006; Hertz,
2006; Bollinger and Ziliak, 2007; Bania and Leete, 2007; Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel,
2008; Dahl, Deleire and Schwabish, 2008). Most of these studies use graphical non-
structural approaches, which either impose strong assumptions on income dynamics,
or only estimate either income volatility or permanent income dispersion, but not
both. Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2008) measures household income volatility
as the cross-sectional distribution of income changes. Bania and Leete (2007) use
coefficient of variation. Hacker (2006) apply a simple decomposition method that are
consistent with formal income dynamics model only under a particular maintained
assumption. In this paper I apply Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008) latest method to
estimate a formal error-component model of life cycle income dynamics with calendar
time shifts for household income using panel data. Estimation of such model identifies
how permanent and transitory variance in household income or earnings evolve over
time and over the life cycle.
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This paper also compares income dynamics in the United States with two other
industrial countries: Germany and Great Britain. A few studies have explored the
income dynamics in industrial countries other than the United States. An increase
in both permanent and transitory variances in earnings dynamics are also found in
Germany (Burkhauser et al. 1997), Canada (Baker and Solon, 2003; Beach et al.,
2003, 2008), Great Britain (Dickens 1996), and Sweden (Gustavsson 2004). However,
due to the lack of comparable data sets, comparisons in income dynamics among
these industrial countries are rarely examined. Given their similarities in income
level and economic development but differences in educational and wage-setting in-
stitutions as well as family structure, such cross-national comparisons could provide
important benchmarks of how income inequality and volatility in the United States
differs from or is similar to other industrial countries, and how different social poli-
cies cope with income volatility or permanent income dispersion. Gottschalk and
Smeeding (1997) uses Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to examine cross-sectional
inequality in earnings and family income up to the early 1990s. LIS contains com-
parable income measures from repeated cross-sectional data, but it is not feasible for
the study of income volatility, which requires longitudinal data sets. To the best of
my knowledge, Cross-national Equivalence File (CNEF) is the only available longitu-
dinal data file that contains equivalently constructed income variables in the United
States and other industrial countries. I use the latest CNEF from 1979 to 2006 which
consists of comparable income measures from longitudinal data sets in the United
States (the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics), Germany (German Socio-
Economic Panel) and Great Britain (British Household Panel Study). From CNEF
I can examine how the trends in household income volatility and permanent income
dispersion in the United States differ from other advanced industrial countries.
Estimation of a formal error components model shows the following results:
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First, transitory variance accounts for more than half of the total variance in house-
hold income, about 56-78 percent in the United States, 67-85 percent in West Ger-
many and 51-68 percent in the Great Britain. Second, despite the differences in
cross-sectional income inequality among the three countries, the permanent house-
hold income dispersion converges since the late 1990s, while the household income
volatility does not converge. Third, comparison between married couple’s individual
earnings volatility and their combined household earnings volatility suggests some
evidence of household smoothing: In all three countries, household earnings volatility
is lower than the average of the individual earnings volatility. When female and male
earnings volatility goes to the opposite direction, household earnings usually more
stable. Such household smoothing evidence is stronger in the United States than
West Germany and Great Britain.
1.2 Literature review
There has been a substantial literature on the income dynamics of individual earn-
ings or household income in the United States, as well as in other industrial coun-
tries. Most of these studies examine the changes in overall cross-sectional inequality.
Gottschalk and Danziger (2005) analyze distributional changes in hourly wage rates,
annual earnings and family income from 1975 to 2002. Both male wage rate inequality
and family income inequality rose up sharply during the early 1980s, increased at a
slower rate through the early 1990s then stabilized at a high level through the early
2000s. The increase family income primarily reflects increased inequality of wage
rates. Such increases in income inequality are also found in other industrial countries
(Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997, among others).
The rise in income inequality is often assumed to be caused by the larger
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dispersion of permanent income, but a cross-sectional variance can also increase if
the variance of year-to-year fluctuations, the transitory variance, rises. The study
of the trends in permanent and transitory variance in income helps to understand
the causes of growing overall income inequality. Several methods are used to decom-
pose the cross-sectional variances into permanent variances and transitory variances.
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) estimate the permanent and transitory variances with
standard random effects models within each nine-year time window. Moffitt and
Gottschalk (1998) develop an approximate nonparametric method and a formal error
components model to estimate the permanent and transitory variances based on the
variance-covariance matrix of log earnings. Their nonparametric method is based on
the definition that the transitory variance fades out if time lag is long enough. The
formal error components model allows the permanent component follows a random
walk, and the transitory component follows an ARMA (1,1) process, so that transi-
tory shocks are serially correlated. This error component model is further modified
in Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008) to allow for left censoring, and a random growth
in the permanent component in addition to random walk. Haider (2001) develops
a heterogeneous growth model where earnings are decomposed as a mean-reverting
earnings shock and a permanent component, including a period-specific factor loading
with heterogenous growth term. Different methods come to similar conclusions that
the transitory variance in male earnings increases from the 1970s to 1980s.
An increase in both permanent and transitory variances in earnings dynamics
are also found in some other developed countries, but not all. Baker and Solon (2003)
use longitudinal income tax records from Canada. They find that the substantial in-
crease in male earnings inequality over the sample period of 1976 to 1992 stemmed
from upward trends in both permanent and transitory components, while the perma-
nent component plays a somewhat more significant role. Beach et al. (2008) examines
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male and female earnings variability in Canada over the period of 1982 to 2000 using
the random effects model within the moving calendar time windows of fixed length .
From the Longitudinal Administrative Database, they find that permanent variance
has generally increased over the sample period, but the transitory variance has pretty
steadily decreased, except during the early 1990s recession, which is quite different
from the trends in transitory variance in the United States, using different methods.
Changes in the cross-sectional earnings inequality have been driven primarily by the
permanent inequality. Dickens (1996) studies the dynamic structure of male wages in
Great Britain using the New Earnings Survey Panel from 1975 to 1995. He finds that
a permanent component of earnings has increased over the life cycle and the transi-
tory component is highly persistent and serially correlated. The estimated variances
of both components have risen over this period, and each explains about half the rise
in inequality. Gustavsson (2004) uses the Longitudinal Individual Data for Sweden to
examine the transitory and permanent variances of male annual earnings in Sweden
between 1960 and 1990. The permanent variance displays a downward trend during
the entire sample period, with the rate of decline more rapid until the early 1980s,
than afterwards. The transitory variance has increased until early 1970s, decreased
slightly through the late 1970s, and then rose again through the 1980s.
Cross-national comparisons are rarely examined due to the lack of comparable
data. The estimation of the transitory variance requires longitudinal data instead of
cross-sectional data. To my knowledge there are only two longitudinal data files avail-
able for such cross-national studies. One is CNEF which contains equivalently defined
variables from the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Australia, Switzerland and
Canada. Daly and Valletta (2008) use a heterogeneous growth model to compare male
permanent and transitory earnings in the United States, Germany and Great Britain.
They find substantial convergence in both permanent and transitory components of
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male earnings inequality in these three countries during the 1990s. This convergence
is primarily driven by the declining inequality in the United States and rising in-
equality in Germany at the same time. Another longitudinal data file feasible for
cross-national comparison is the European Community Household Panel (ECHP),
which contains European countries only. Sologon and O’Donogue (2009) use ECHP
to explore the male earnings dynamics for 14 European Union countries. Increases in
inequality appear to reflect increases in permanent earnings variance in Luxembourg,
Italy, Greece and Finland, and increases in both permanent and transitory variances
in Portugal and Netherlands. Decreases in inequality appear to result from decreases
in the transitory variances in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Ireland,
in permanent variance in Belgium and Spain, and in both components in Denmark
and Austria. ECHP contain more countries than CNEF, but have relatively shorter
panel (eight years). I use CNEF because my primary research interest focus on the
comparison of income dynamics in the United States with other countries, and CNEF
contains longer panel.
1.3 Model specification of income dynamics
I use a formal error components model to estimate the permanent and the transitory
variance in income dynamics. There is a large literature on the formulations of such
models (Lillard and Willis, 1978; MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989; for a
review see MaCurdy, 2007). These studies suggest that the permanent component
evolves over the life cycle, and the transitory component is serially correlated, usually
represented by a low-order ARMA process. I specify a model similar to Moffitt and
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Gottschalk (2008) which contains all above features:
yiat = αtµia + υiat
µia = µi,a−1 + ωia
υiat = ρυi,a−1,t−1 + βtξia + θ(βt−1ξi,a−1)
(1.1)
where yiat is the log income residuals after a first-stage regression, for individual or
household i at age a in calendar year t. It is composed of a permanent component
αtµia, where αt is loading factor, and a transitory component υiat. Random walk
ωia arrives randomly and it is not mean-reverting. The transitory shock evolves with
an ARMA (1,1) process typically found in the literature, fading out at rate ρ and
deviating from that smooth fade-out rate by θ in the next period. 1 The transitory
shock is mean-reverting.
Assume E(µia) = E(ωia) = E(ξia) = 0, these three variables are all orthogonal
from each other, and initial conditions µi0 6= 0, υi0 = 0. Assume all forcing errors
to be i.i.d. except ξia, as transitory shocks are likely to be greater at younger ages.
Two other assumptions include: µ evolves over the life cycle but not with calendar
time, and the transitory shock ξ is a function of a and t, but not with i. Although
all the parameters in the model could shift with calendar time, I follow the literature
and only allow calendar time shifts appear in the loading factor of the permanent
component αt and the forces of the transitory component βt.
The identification of the parameters is as follows: when ρ is not too high, the
covariances becomes small within the finite lifetime of an individual. The permanent
variance can be identified primarily by the long autocovariances and also through
1This model is the same as specification in Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008) except that their
permanent component also allows for a random growth factor in addition to random walk. The
variance of random growth is very small (0.000038) in their estimation. In another version of this
study, we also use a random growth model, which is the same as in Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008).
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extrapolation. The calendar time shifts can be identified from changes in parameters
across multiple cohorts.
Time-varying parameters also introduce the left-censoring problem since these
parameters cannot be identified prior to the initial year when we start observing the
data, but their evolutions before the initial year affect the variances and covariances
after the initial year. To address this issue, Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008) introduce
a new parameter γ which allows the transitory variances in the initial year to deviate
from what they would be if βt = 1 for year prior to the initial year, with γ = 0
implying no deviation. The initial conditions and normalizations for equation (1.1)
are defined as follows:
α1 = 1; β1 = 1
V ar(µi1) = σ
2
µ1;V ar(ωiat) = σ
2
ω
Define a1 as household head’s age in initial year, let age 20 equals to a = 1
if a1 ≤ 1 (non-left-censored), then assume:
υi1t = ρυi,0,t−1 + ξit, V ar(υi1t) = σ2υ1 + σ
2
ξt
if a1 > 1 (left-censored), then assume:
V ar(υi,a1,1) = Σ
P
p=1γ0 + σ
2
ξ1
(1.2)
The parameters need to be estimated in equation (1.1) and (1.2) are: αt, βt, σ
2
ξ1,
ρ, θ, σ2µ1, σ
2
ω,σ
2
υ1 and γ. I estimate the model using minimum distance estimation
developed by Chamberlain (1984).2 The parameters are estimated by minimizing the
sum of squared deviations between the observed elements in the variance-covariance
matrix and the predicted elements implied in the theoretical model, with an identity
2I thank Peter Gottschalk for generously share his STATA MATA program of estimating the
formal error components model.
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weighting matrix. Let sim = yijyik , where yij and yik are the log income residuals for
each age-year cell j and k, and where m = 1, ...,M indexes the individual moments
for the products of residuals j and k. Denote θ as the set of unknown parameters. I
choose θ to minimize the sum of squared residuals:
Min
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
[sim − f(θ, j, k)]2 (1.3)
The standard errors are obtained by a method illustrated in Moffitt and Gottschalk
(2008): denote eim as residuals from equation (1.3) to form an M by M covariance
matrix Ω, each element of Ω is estimated by:
σˆmm′ = (1/N)
N∑
i=1
eimeim′ (1.4)
Define ∆ as the NM by NM covariance matrix of residuals which is a block diagonal
matrix with the matrix Ω on the diagonals. Then
cov(θˆ) = (G′G)−1G′∆G(G′G)−1 (1.5)
where G is a matrix of gradients of f(θ, j, k) over θ.
Such a formal error components model has several advantages over other esti-
mation methods used in the income dynamics literature. Earlier work by Gottschalk
and Moffitt (1994) use a standard random effects model, where the permanent com-
ponent for each individual is the average of his or her earnings across a 9-year period,
then calculate the variance across all individuals. The transitory variance is calculated
from the variance of the residuals from each individual mean, then average across all
individuals. This method is applied in Beach et al. (2003, 2008) and is modified with
a moving calendar time windows of fixed length. This method does not account for
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serial correlation in the transitory component. Another method is an approximate
nonparametric method. It defines covariance of income between “long” periods as
the permanent variance, and defines the difference between variance and covariance
as the transitory variance. This method is applied in Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002,
2008), Hacker (2006), and it is based on the following model:
yit = µi + νit (1.6)
where µi is a time invariant component with variance σ
2
µ and νit is a white noise tran-
sitory component with variance σ2ν . Two components are independent of each other.
Given cov(νit, νit′) = 0, the cross-sectional variances and covariances of residuals yit
are given by:
V ar(yit) = σ
2
µ + σ
2
ν (1.7)
Cov(yit, yit′) = σ
2
µ (1.8)
From the variance-covariance matrix of log income, the permanent variance is esti-
mated through the off-diagonal elements, and the transitory variance is the difference
between the total variance and the permanent variance. Such method is nonpara-
metric because it makes no assumption about how the permanent component evolves
over time, for instance, random walk or random growth. This is only an approximate
method. If the transitory component is serially correlated, then the effects of past
transitory shocks are never equal to zero. Therefore, a long lag is needed to get a
good approximation.
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1.4 Data
This paper uses the Cross National Equivalent File (CNEF) prepared by the Depart-
ment of Policy Analysis and Management at Cornell University. I use the 1980-2006
CNEF data, which consists of equivalently defined income variables from the Michi-
gan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1979-2002, the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) 1983-2004, and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 1990-
2000.3 I only include the West Germany sample in GSOEP because data for East
Germany (former German Democratic Republic) before 1990 is not available.4 All
years are referred to the income years. PSID skipped interviews every other year
staring interview year 1998, so the last four observations are for income years 1996,
1998, 2000 and 2002. All three data sets are longitudinal so that I observe income
over time for the same household or same individual.
CNEF constructed equivalently defined income variables across countries. The
codebook of CNEF provides a description of how each variable is created, the algo-
rithm used to create each variable from the original panel data, and it also provides a
reliability code which tells the degree of cross-national comparability, with “1” repre-
sents completely comparable. All income variables I use in this paper are completely
comparable between three countries.
The household income variable used in this paper is post-tax and transfer
annual household income. It is the sum of the total household income from the labor
earnings of all household members, asset flows, private retirement income, private
3In addition to above three data sets I use, CNEF also includes the Household Income and Labor
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 2001-2005, the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 1999-2005, and the
Canadian Survey of Labor and Income Dynamics (SLID) 1993-2005. HILDA and SHP are too short
to identify the transitory variance as it requires observing income changes for sufficient long time.
The access to SLID data is partly restrictive.
4Therefore, for those individuals who moved from East Germany to West Germany at some
point, I only observe their income after they moved.
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transfers, public transfers, and social security pensions net of total household taxes.5
The total household income is divided by an equivalence scale which is adjusted based
on household size to account for economies of scale of household members compared
to single individuals.6
For the comparison of income at the household level and the individual level,
I use household labor income variable and individual labor earnings variable. The
household labor income variable includes the combined labor income of the head,
partner and other family members. The individual labor earnings include wages and
salary from all employment including self-employment. Unlike household income,
household labor income and individual labor earnings do not have negative values.
For the main analysis of cross-national comparison of household income, I
follow household heads aged between 20 and 59 with positive household income.
Household income is adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index in each
country, and set year 1996 as base year. I include every observation for each household
that meet these restrictions, hence households might drop out and reappear in the
sample over time. I also trim the top and bottom 1 percent outliers of the household
income within year-age group (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59) cell to reduce noise, which
is a standard procedure in the income inequality literature. The sample includes 5,239
households with a total of 115,022 household-year observations in the United States;
4,248 households with 88,312 observations in West Germany; and 3,672 households
with 37,571 observations in the Great Britain. Summary statistics are presented at
Table 1.1. Average household income is higher in the United States than the other
5Total household taxes includes income taxes of the head, partner and other family members, as
well as payroll taxes of the head and partner. The PSID data do not provide information on payroll
taxes. They are calculated by bracketing labor income and applying the average payroll tax rate for
that bracket as reported by the Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1990, page
33.
6I use general official United States Equivalence Weight that is computed based on household
size. This equivalence scale is available in CNEF data.
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two countries. In Great Britain the proportion of individuals who are married is the
highest, with more children and larger family size than the United States and West
Germany. The standard deviation of the household income across all years is higher
in the United States than in West Germany and Great Britain.
A variance-covariance matrix is formed based on residuals from regressions of
log earnings on household head’s age, age square, a dummy for whether he is married
and the number of children in the household. A separate regression is run for each
year.7 This first stage regression controls for the changes in the mean household
income, thus the analysis in the next section examines the within group variances. I
calculate the covariance between income at age a and a′ and between year t and year
t′, indexed with year, age and lag length.
1.5 Household income dynamics in the United States,
West Germany and Great Britain
I estimate the income dynamics model in equation (1.1) and compute the permanent
and transitory variances, in each year, for each age group. Table 1.2 presents the
estimated αs of household income dynamics, Table 1.3 presents the estimated βs, and
Table 1.4 presents estimates of other parameters. These time-varying coefficients of αs
and βs are the main driving force of the trends in permanent variance and transitory
variance, respectively. The transitory shocks in household income are significantly
serially correlated at a rate of 0.78 in the United States, 0.76 in West Germany and
0.70 in the Great Britain.
Figure 1.1 plots the actual and predicted cross-sectional variances in log house-
7The first stage regression does not include education variable, as in the Great Britain education
information is missing from BHPS.
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hold income in three countries, taking an average across the four age groups. The
predicted variances from the model match empirical variance from the data very well.
The United States has the highest overall inequality among all three countries, and
West Germany has the lowest inequality for the past two decades. Household income
inequality in the United States increased since the 1980s, declined in the late 1990s
and then rose up again in the 2000s. This trend is consistent with other studies such
as Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) (Figure 4) and Nichols and Zimmerman (2008).
In West Germany, income inequality gradually increases over time, with the largest
jump around the reunification in 1990. In Great Britain household income inequality
does not change much in the 1990s.
Figure 1.2 plots the permanent variance and transitory variance in each year,
taking an average across four age groups. The top figure plots the permanent variance
for three countries. In the United States, the permanent variance steadily increased
through the 1980s, gradually decreased since the mid 1990s. In West Germany, the
permanent variance mildly increased through the late 1990s, then leveled off after-
wards. The permanent variance in Great Britain rose in the early 1990s then declines.
Despite the large difference among three countries in the 1980s, the perma-
nent dispersion of household income converges since the late 1990s. In addition, the
permanent dispersion does not increase since the mid 1990s in all three countries.
The rank for the three countries in terms of permanent household income dispersion
changes over time. West Germany always has the lowest permanent income disper-
sion, while the Great Britain have a higher permanent income dispersion than the
United States for most of the sample period (1992 to 1999).
The bottom figure in Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of household income tran-
sitory variances. Unlike the permanent variances, the transitory variances do not have
a clear convergence pattern in these three industrial countries. Transitory variance
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goes up in the long run but is subject to cyclical changes in the United States and
West Germany. In the Great Britain it goes up more steadily. Such income volatility
seems to be more dramatic in the United States than in European countries, especially
after the 1990s.
I also examine how much of the overall cross-sectional inequality is attributable
to income volatility rather than the permanent dispersion. Figure 1.4 compares the
total variance, the permanent variance and the transitory variance in the United
States. Figure 1.5 and 1.6 presents trends in three variances in West Germany and
Great Britain. The transitory variance accounts for at least half of the overall inequal-
ity, about 56 to 78 percent in the United States, 67 to 85 percent in West Germany
and 51 to 68 percent in Great Britain. For the same period of 1990-2000, transitory
variance accounts for 70 percent of total variation in the United States, 73 percent in
the West Germany and 58 percent in the Great Britain. Trends in transitory variance
are mostly coincide with trends in overall inequality, when comparing with Figure 1.1.
This is a pattern that is consistently found in other studies for the United States.
Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008) plot the transitory variance against the unemployment
rate. They find that transitory variances are largely cyclical, thus it is more difficult
to sort out the trend in the transitory variance, especially when there is a cycle at
the end of the period. In my study of household income dynamics, that trends in
transitory variance are also cyclical.
Now I discuss the findings in my paper with other studies that focus on male
individual earnings. Daly and Valletta (2008) apply a heterogeneous growth model
as in Haider (2001) to examine the cross-national trends in the transitory and per-
manent variances in the United States, Germany and the Great Britain, using CNEF
from 1979 to 1999. The age cuts are male heads 25-61, while age cuts in my paper is
households with heads aged 20-59. The trends in household income transitory vari-
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ance in my paper are very similar to their findings of male earnings for the United
States and West Germany, but quite different for the Great Britain. This suggests
that the driving forces of household income volatility mainly come from male earn-
ings volatility in the United States and West Germany. Household income volatility
in Great Britain maybe more attributable to other factors such as female earnings
volatility, or volatility in unearned income such as transfer income or asset income.
In the next section, I further compare the transitory variances in household income
and in individual earnings in each country.
1.6 Compare the income volatility at the house-
hold level and at the individual level for mar-
ried couples
Household income is the sum of all household members’ individual income, thus it
could involve joint decisions of more than one person. In this section I examine
whether the trends and magnitude of the household income volatility differs from
the individual volatility, which could potentially provide some evidence on intra-
household insurance behavior.
The sample in this section contains only married couples. The main goal in this
section is to examine if there is any evidence of household smoothing, while single or
divorced individuals would not have spousal smoothing behavior. In addition, house-
hold income volatility in these intact families would not involve in family formations
and dissolutions.
The household level variable I use is household earnings, which is the combined
labor earnings of a married couple, instead of the total household income used in the
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previous section. The main reason for this switch is that the total household income
also includes property income and transfers, in addition to labor earnings. Some
of these transfers are given to the entire household, and couples may not equally
divide transfers or property income. It is difficult to construct a proper measure of
individual income to assign pooled non-labor income. Therefore, I use household
earnings variable so that it is comparable to male and female individual earnings
variables.
Figure 1.6 compares the male earnings volatility, the female earnings volatility
with their combined earnings volatility in the United States. Figure 1.7 presents the
results in West Germany and Figure 1.8 presents the results in Great Britain. Female
earnings volatility are much higher than either male or household earnings volatility.
This is not a surprising result, as many married women are the secondary workers in
the household, thus, are more likely to change participation status (full-time, part-
time) or hours of working. Note that since the estimation is based on log earnings, the
sample excludes those who have zero earnings for the entire year. However, married
women who change participation status within a year still contribute to the transitory
variance in their earnings. Figure 1.9 compares the trends in transitory variance of
female earnings in three countries. Married women’s income volatility constantly
increased over the past two decades, in the United States as well as in European
countries. From Figure 1.6 to 1.8 I also find that such increases in female earnings
volatility are much larger than male earnings volatility.
Comparing the magnitude of earnings volatility at the household level and
at the individual level, I find that the household earnings volatility is always much
lower than the average of the male and female individual earnings volatility. In the
United States, household earnings volatility is even lower than male earnings volatility,
although this is not true in West Germany and Great Britain.
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Several stories could explain why household earnings volatility is lower than
individual earnings volatility. One possible explanation is intra-household insurance
hypothesis: an individual may adjust his or her earnings by change work hours or
switch jobs, to buffer the changes in a partner’s earnings, so that their combined
earnings are more stable. Existing literature suggest that transitory shocks might
be insurable (Dynarski and Gruber, 1997; Blundell et al., 2008). Another possible
explanation is individuals seek spouses whose earnings shocks are negatively corre-
lated with their own earnings shocks. For instance, people who work in the financial
industry may prefer to find a spouse with a more stable job, say a faculty position.
Next I compare the trends in household earnings volatility and the individual
earnings volatility. In the United States, from 1980s to mid-1990s, male and female
earnings volatility always move with an opposite direction: a sharp rise in female
earnings volatility from 1982 to 1984 is accompanied by a decline in male earnings
volatility at the same time. Likewise, a decline in female earnings volatility from 1990
to 1992 is accompanied by a rise in male earnings volatility. However, such counter-
movement pattern is replaced by a co-movement from mid-1990s to early 2000s. In
West German and Great Britain, male and female earnings volatility usually move in
the same direction, but there are also some periods of counter-movement, 1992-1997
in West Germany and 1993-1995 in Great Britain. From this descriptive analysis
we do not know what is the causes of such counter-movement, but intra-household
insurance seems to be one plausible explanations.
Another pattern is that, the trends in household earning volatility are more
similar to the trends in male earnings volatility rather than female earnings volatil-
ity. My interpretation is that male average earnings are higher than female average
earnings, therefore male earnings have a larger weight in determining the the move-
ment of household earnings. However, the increase in household earnings volatility
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is usually less than the increase in male earnings volatility. Again, this is in favor
of the intra-household insurance story. Spousal smoothing behavior help household
earnings volatility change less than individual earnings volatility.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I examine the recent trends of household income dynamics in the United
States, West Germany and Great Britain, using CNEF 1979-2006 file. I estimate a
formal error-components model as in Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008), to study how
permanent variances and transitory variances change over time and how these trends
differ in three countries. I find that the permanent household income dispersion con-
verges among three countries in the late 1990s, while transitory variance displays a
more cyclical pattern. Household income volatility accounts for more than half of the
overall cross-sectional inequality in all three countries. Comparison of income volatil-
ity at the household level with the individual level for married families also suggest
some evidence of household smoothing, especially in the United States. These findings
deserve further investigation with formal economic models of household behavior.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max
United States
Log household income 9.80 0.785 -1.05 15.03
Age of head 40.0 10.38 20 59
Married 0.55 0.50 0 1
Number of children 0.91 1.14 0 9
Family size 2.71 1.48 1 14
West Germany
Log household income 9.65 0.638 0.63 2.81
Age of head 41.0 10.65 20 59
Married 0.54 0.50 0 1
Number of children 0.61 0.92 0 10
Family size 2.51 1.34 1 17
Great Britain
Log household income 9.26 0.693 -0.80 2.39
Age of head 41.0 10.39 20 59
Married 0.68 0.47 0 1
Number of children 1.12 1.53 0 16
Family size 2.82 1.36 1 11
Note: Log household income is divided by equivalence of scale;
Means taken before trimming and over all household-year observations
26
Table 1.2: Estimates of Alphas in the Error Components Model of Log Household
Income
United States West Germany Great Britain
Year Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Alpha’s
1980 1.027 0.054
1981 1.058 0.061
1982 1.192 0.075
1983 1.238 0.080
1984 1.277 0.092 1.027 0.183
1985 1.317 0.100 1.005 0.192
1986 1.313 0.099 1.095 0.201
1987 1.364 0.101 1.210 0.256
1988 1.429 0.102 1.198 0.358
1989 1.487 0.110 1.223 0.390
1990 1.493 0.114 1.369 0.315
1991 1.522 0.120 1.505 0.414 1.190 0.091
1992 1.497 0.122 1.534 0.397 1.145 0.086
1993 1.465 0.122 1.535 0.417 1.244 0.113
1994 1.443 0.127 1.660 0.457 1.249 0.149
1995 1.425 0.119 1.513 0.408 1.194 0.142
1996 1.237 0.103 1.463 0.453 1.164 0.151
1997 1.668 0.407 1.145 0.145
1998 0.814 0.086 1.539 0.406 1.065 0.114
1999 1.404 0.464 1.007 0.123
2000 0.907 0.088 1.398 0.389 1.020 0.268
2001 1.634 0.478
2002 0.928 0.096 1.638 0.439
2003 1.781 0.457
2004 1.539 0.380
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Table 1.3: Estimates of Betas in the Error Components Model of Log Household
Income
United States West Germany Great Britain
Year Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Beta’s
1980 1.116 0.287
1981 1.396 0.436
1982 1.471 0.433
1983 1.534 0.466
1984 1.535 0.437 0.893 0.284
1985 1.500 0.452 0.738 0.224
1986 1.558 0.434 0.640 0.207
1987 1.421 0.425 0.612 0.207
1988 1.368 0.388 0.483 0.176
1989 1.575 0.453 0.631 0.271
1990 1.384 0.400 0.570 0.204
1991 1.668 0.478 0.522 0.201 0.958 0.227
1992 2.008 0.627 0.757 0.293 1.085 0.314
1993 2.616 0.747 0.732 0.248 0.921 0.297
1994 2.334 0.723 0.770 0.326 0.951 0.352
1995 1.797 0.657 0.721 0.345 0.892 0.264
1996 2.278 0.585 0.734 0.281 0.914 0.340
1997 0.816 0.313 1.013 0.314
1998 2.706 0.686 0.807 0.296 1.111 0.444
1999 1.023 0.337 1.164 0.298
2000 2.176 0.556 0.767 0.242 1.360 0.810
2001 0.816 0.261
2002 3.060 0.775 0.812 0.255
2003 0.806 0.272
2004 0.767 0.310
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Table 1.4: Estimates of Other Parameters in the Error Components Model of Log
Household Income
United States West Germany Great Britain
Year Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
σ2ξ1 0.086 0.022 0.152 0.042 0.116 0.023
σ2µ1 0.058 0.008 0.021 0.010 0.094 0.015
ρ 0.779 0.028 0.757 0.048 0.697 0.110
θ -0.433 0.031 -0.375 0.050 -0.349 0.126
σ2ω ∗ 100 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001
γ0 0.054 0.073 -0.055 0.028 0.034 0.072
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Figure 1.1: Actual and predicted cross-sectional variance in log household income in
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Figure 1.2: Trends in the permanent variance (top) and transitory variance (bottom)
of log household income in the United States, West Germany and Great Britain
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hold income in the United States, 1979-2002
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Figure 1.4: Total variance, permanent variance and transitory variance of log house-
hold income in West Germany, 1983-2004
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Figure 1.5: Total variance, permanent variance and transitory variance of log house-
hold income in Great Britain, 1990-2000
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Figure 1.6: Earnings volatility for married men, married women and household earn-
ings volatility in the United States
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ings volatility in West Germany
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Figure 1.8: Earnings volatility for married men, married women and household earn-
ings volatility in Great Britain
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Figure 1.9: Transitory variances in married women’s log earnings in the United States,
West Germany and Great Britain
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Chapter 2
How Do Wage Shocks Affect the
Labor Supply Decisions of Married
Couples?
2.1 Introduction
Rising earnings and income volatility over the last few decades in the United States
has been well documented in existing studies (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994; Moffitt
and Gottschalk, 1998, 2002, 2008; Haider 2001; Hyslop, 2001; Dahl et al., 2008;
Dynan et al., 2008; Shin and Solon, 2008). This has been of concern to policymakers,
since it is associated with an increase in risk and a reduction in welfare. Government
provides social insurance, transfers, and taxation, to buffer the welfare loss caused by
income volatility. Meanwhile, individuals who live in the same household may also
provide insurance against each other’s income shocks by making joint decisions, such
as asset accumulation and depletion, durable goods replacement, and ex-post labor
supply adjustments, etc.
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The goal of this paper is to examine whether, and how, married couples make
joint decisions to insure against each other’s income shocks. In doing so, I aim to
answer the following three questions: how married couples adjust labor supplies in
response to each other’s wage shocks, whether they respond to permanent and tran-
sitory wage shocks differently, and what the implications of such household decisions
are for overall income volatility.1 The answer to these questions will provide a bet-
ter understanding of intra-household insurance as a risk-coping strategy in reaction
to rising earnings volatility. Understanding the degree to which couples are willing
to insure is important for assessing the performance of private insurance markets
as well as the efficiency of government insurance policies. Moreover, the distinc-
tion between permanent shocks and transitory shocks will provide implications for
policies that target shocks at different persistency levels. For instance, Social Se-
curity Disability Insurance (SSDI) provides income to people who are disabled with
a condition expected to last at least twelve months. Unemployment insurance, on
the other hand, protects people from temporary income loss. These policies could
have different impacts on household labor supply decisions. Also, intra-household
insurance would have aggregate implications. For example, household members may
respond to individual earnings volatility by making joint decisions, so that income at
the household level becomes less volatile. Intra-household insurance may also lead to
a more smoothed consumption profile, which affects consumption inequality or the
transmission from income to consumption inequality.
Studies on insurance for income shocks have a long history in both macroeco-
nomics and labor economics. In macroeconomic theory, the complete market hypothe-
sis assumes that both permanent and transitory income shocks are fully insured, while
1Permanent shocks are defined as shocks that people expect to persist into the future which are
not mean-reverting. Transitory shocks are caused by temporary and random influences which are
mean-reverting.
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the permanent income hypothesis assumes that only transitory shocks are insured and
consumption depends primarily on permanent income. Empirical studies using both
micro and aggregate data find mixed evidence (Cochrane, 1991; Altonji et al., 1992;
Townsend, 1994; Attanasio and Pavoni, 2007; Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2008).
These studies of insurance for income shocks focus on consumption smoothing over
time, via inter-temporal savings and borrowing. They take labor supply decisions as
given, which could be another important insurance mechanism. In labor economics,
studies on insurance for income shocks focus on temporary changes in wives’ labor
supply in response to husbands’ unemployment or transitory earnings shocks, also
known as “added worker effect” in the literature. Lundberg (1985) has found a small
added worker effect from the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments.
Juhn and Potter (2007) use matched March Current Population Survey (CPS) files,
and find that the added worker effect is still important among a subset of couples, but
that the overall value of marriage as a risk-sharing arrangement has diminished, due
to the greater positive co-movement of employment among couples. Using the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Garcia-Escribano (2004) finds that the smooth-
ing resulting from the wives’ labor response is significant for households with limited
access to credit. These studies on insurance via labor supply decisions have focused
on wives’ responses to husbands’ shocks, but not the reverse. Yet with women’s labor
supply and participation rising so sharply in the past quarter century, this reverse
response is arguably just as important.
In order to investigate how married couples adjust labor supply to insure
against each other’s wage shocks, I build a theory based on the collective frame-
work developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Donni (2003). The main advantage
of this model is that under a minimal set of assumptions, individual preferences and
intra-household allocations can be uncovered, without imposing any specific structure
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on the decision process.2 The weighted maximization of household members’ utili-
ties can be decentralized, subject to a lump-sum income transfer, also known as the
“sharing rule”, which specifies how to allocate household resources. This sharing rule
depends on each agent’s wage in the existing collective models. I expand the scope
of the sharing rule to act as a function of permanent and transitory wage shocks. In
addition to the standard income and substitution effect that wage shocks have on
individual’s own labor supply, these shocks also affect spousal labor supply, through
this sharing rule. This is the main channel through which I examine how individual
wage shocks affect spousal labor supply.
This paper makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the existing
literature on insurance for income shocks and collective models. First, I develop an
intra-household insurance model based on collective models by Chiappori (1988, 1992)
and Donni (2003), to examine whether and how married couples insure against each
other’s shocks by making joint labor supply decisions. I modify the static collective
models along the following dimensions: I introduce permanent and transitory wage
shocks into the function of the sharing rule, extend the single-period collective model
over a multi-period context, and incorporate savings decisions. Second, this paper
also contributes to the empirical studies using collective models by examining labor
supply with non-participation using high-frequency data in the United States for
the first time.3 Third, I provide structural explanations of how much of the overall
individual and household earnings volatility can be explained by such intra-household
decisions.
This paper uses the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and
2The basic assumptions include household allocations are Pareto efficient and preferences are
either egotistic or caring.
3For empirical studies using collective models with non-participation, Blundell et al. (2007)
use Great Britain data, Bloemen (2004) uses Dutch data, Hourriez (2005) uses French data and
Vermeulen (2005) uses Belgian data.
41
the main findings are as follows: An individual increases his or her labor supply
when the spouse receives an adverse wage shock, no matter permanent or transitory.
Such labor supply response is larger when the shock is permanent. There is little
evidence of insurance when the husband becomes unemployed. Couples make less
transfer to the individual with more volatile income, which can be considered as a
price for insurance. Estimation results also suggest that intra-household insurance
reduces earnings volatility by about 1.1% to 7.7%.
Section 2.2 provides a literature review on related studies. Section 2.3 presents
stylized facts on individual and household income volatility. In Section 2.4, a collec-
tive model is formulated, which allows for insurance against permanent and transitory
wage shocks. Section 2.5 describes the data, and discusses empirical strategies and es-
timation results. Section 2.6 uses estimation results of the model to provide structural
explanations to the stylized facts. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
If markets are complete, then individuals’ consumption would not respond to idiosyn-
cratic income shocks. Several studies test this full risk sharing assumption within
households or extended families using data from U.S. as well as developing coun-
tries. Cochrane (1991) presents cross-sectional regressions of consumption growth on
a variety of idiosyncratic variables using food consumption from PSID. Full insur-
ance is rejected for shocks such as long illness and involuntary job loss, but not for
spells of unemployment, loss of work due to strike, and an involuntary move. Altonji
et al. (1992) focus on risk sharing within American families but find no evidence of
risk sharing. In developing countries especially in rural area, where income volatil-
ities are higher, insurance and credit markets are imperfect for the poor, there are
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more evidence in favor of risk sharing. Townsend (1994) found that household con-
sumption in village India are not much influenced by contemporaneous own income,
sickness, unemployment, or other idiosyncratic shocks, controlling for village level
risk. Fafchamps and Lund (2001) examine data in rural Philippines, they find that
shocks have a strong effect on gifts and informal loans, but little effect on sales of live-
stock and grain. Mutual insurance does not appear to take place at the village level;
rather, households receive help primarily through networks of friends and relatives.
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) testing risk sharing within households using unpredicted
illness shocks as a measure of individual idiosyncratic shocks. They find that in most
households full risk sharing of illness shocks takes place.
The above risk sharing studies focus on consumption smoothing, where utility
only depends on one dimensional consumption, and risk sharing comes from ex-ante
savings decision. While there is another stream of literature that studies how people
share income risk via ex-post labor supply adjustment. This is usually referred as
“added worker effect” literature (Lundberg, 1985; Maloney, 1987; Stephens, 2002;
Juhn and Potter, 2007), which studies a temporary increase in the labor supply of
married women whose husbands have become unemployed. These studies only exam-
ines one-sided effect, namely, women’s participation decision in response to husbands’
unemployment, under the assumption that husbands are the primary earners in the
households and most of them work full-time, thus they do not respond to wive’s un-
employment shocks. Although labor supply elasticities for married women are higher
than married men, it is still worth to explore labor supply responses from both sides
as a result of household smoothing or risk sharing mechanism.
In order to examine how household members make joint decisions, a particular
attractive model is the collective model first developed by Chiappori(1988). To maxi-
mize household welfare as a whole, household members have to decide who gets what
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share of the total. Chiappori (1988), Browning et al. (1996), and Chiappori et al.
(2002) developed the theoretical framework in which household members jointly tak-
ing Pareto-efficient decisions. They show that if preferences are egoistic and budget
constraints are linear, under the very weak assumption of Pareto efficiency, alloca-
tions can be decentralized into a two-stage budgeting process, according to the Second
Welfare Theorem. In a two-member household, the husband and wife first decide how
to allocate the pooled resources according to certain sharing rule. Then each member
separately chooses labor supply and private consumption. This setting is shown to
generate testable restrictions on labor supplies. Moreover, the observations of labor
supply behavior is sufficient to recover the individual preferences and the sharing rule
(up to a constant). This model provides an useful tool in analyzing intra-household
behavior.
Most studies based on collective model are static and uses cross-sectional data.
Recent studies extend such collective framework to the stochastic world, where house-
hold members not only share income but also share risks. Mazzocco (2004), Maz-
zocco (2005), Mazzocco and Yamaguchi (2006) and Mazzocco (2007) develop a series
of intertemporal collective models. He shows that the main conclusion in the static
collective model still holds when introducing stochastic shocks. In his model house-
hold members can save jointly by using a risk-free asset thus he focuses on savings
decision as an insurance mechanism. He has not yet addressed the interesting issue
of joint labor supply decision as a mechanism for intra-household insurance. In Maz-
zocco (2005) the efficient risk sharing is characterized by Euler equations for public
and private consumptions. Leisure Euler equations could be added but they are sat-
isfied only if corresponding agent supplies a positive amount of labor in each period
and each state of nature, which is an excessively strong assumption. Therefore, this
intertemporal framework can not be generalized to the study of labor supply as a
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mechanism of intra-household risk sharing. 4
Most collective labor supply models assume both household members supply
positive hours, since corner solutions largely complicates the model. As static models
only requires cross-sectional data, this is not a quite restrictive assumption although
it causes selection bias. However, when examining household behavior over time using
panel data, every individual participates in each period would be a very restrictive
assumption. Blundell et al. (2007) derive the restrictions for collective model when
male can only choose to work full time or stay home, while female can choose con-
tinuous labor supply. They estimate this model and test the restrictions using the
U.K. data. The estimates of the sharing rule show that male wages and employment
have a strong influence on bargaining power within couples. Donni (2003) develops
a more general framework in which both male and female labor supply functions are
continuous and either of them can choose nonparticipation. The identification strat-
egy is that when someone does not participate in the labor market, the sharing rule
and preferences can still be identified from spouse’s labor supply.
2.3 Stylized facts on income volatility and intra-
household insurance
In this section, I present some important stylized facts concerning income volatility
at both the household and individual level, for married couples and single individuals.
These stylized facts are consistent with the story of intra-household insurance, which
4In Mazzocco (2007) and Mazzocco and Yamaguchi (2006), they relax the ex-ante Pareto effi-
ciency assumption, so that individual members need not to commit to future allocations at the time
of household formation. Their empirical testing shows household members cannot commit to future
plans, and households renegotiate their decisions over time. This is a potential interesting question
which relates to marriage decisions. Marriage decision is beyond the scope of this paper although it
causes selection issue in this model.
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motivates this paper.
Table 2.1 documents household income volatility, household earnings volatility,
and individual earnings volatility for singles versus married couples, using SIPP 2001
panel, the primary data source for this paper. Income volatility is measured as
the variance of a transitory component of income, which is commonly used in the
existing literature. The formula given at the end of Table 2.1 follows Gottschalk and
Moffitt (1994), which calculates variances for either each household or each individual
over an entire sample period, and then takes the average across these households or
individuals. The sample used is individuals between 20 to 59 years old, who work
positive hours with non-missing wages.
Of particular interest are the following three features of the data: First, tran-
sitory variance in log household income for married couples (0.085) is much lower
than for single individuals (0.152 for males and 0.158 for females). The same pat-
tern can be found for log household earnings. To take into account the covariance
of a two-person income, I also randomly match a single male and a single female to
form “household income”, as the sum of these two, and compare its transitory vari-
ance with that of married couples. These randomly-matched individuals do not have
the household smoothing behavior that married couples might have. Still, married
couples have lower household income and lower household earnings volatility than
randomly-matched single individuals. This may be due to the marriage choice itself,
such as individuals with higher wage or work-hour fluctuations are less likely to get
married. However, I further compute transitory variance in hourly wage rate and
work-hour and show that, on the contrary, singles have even lower wage and work-
hour fluctuations than married individuals. Second, this higher work-hour fluctuation
for married individuals is consistent with the hypothesis that married couples not only
adjust labor supply in response to their own wage shocks, but they also adjust labor
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supply in response to their spouse’s wage shocks. Third, Table 1 also shows that, for
married couples, their household earnings volatility (0.092) is lower than individual
earnings volatility (0.169 for married men and 0.224 for married women). This is also
consistent with the story of household insurance, that couples absorb each other’s
individual earnings shocks so that household earnings do not fluctuate very much.
To see whether such a fact is still true over a longer horizon, I also use Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1982-2002 to compare married couple’s household earn-
ings volatility with individual earnings volatility in each year of that study. Figure
2.1 is adapted from Figure 1.6 in Chapter 1. Over the past twenty years, household
earnings volatility is always lower than either male or female earnings volatility.
The descriptive analysis presented in this section has highlighted several impor-
tant stylized facts for modeling the link between income volatility and decisions within
a household. Married couples’ household earnings volatility is lower than individual
earnings volatility, while married couples have lower household income volatility than
single individuals. These facts could have several other possible explanations, such as
marital sorting, or selection into participation. My contribution is to take one plausi-
ble explanation, the intra-household insurance, and develops a model to examine the
link between earnings volatility and intra-household insurance.
2.4 The model
I build a theory that allows for intra-household insurance, based on the collective
models of household decision-making developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Donni
(2003). The main advantage of their collective models is that they emphasize indi-
vidual preferences and analyze the decision-making process within the household,
without imposing any specific structure on the decision process. Such collective mod-
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els start from basic assumptions that household allocations are Pareto efficient and
preferences are egotistic or caring. The unobserved intra-household allocation, also
known as “sharing rule”, and individual preferences can be uncovered from observed
labor supply. I modify the basic collective model along three dimensions, to address
intra-household insurance against permanent and transitory shocks. First, I introduce
permanent and transitory wage shocks into the sharing rule.5 Second, since perma-
nent shocks are defined as shocks that persist over time, I extend the single-period
collective model over a multi-period context. Third, I incorporate a savings decision
into the model. Following Blundell and Walker (1986), I separate savings and labor
supply decisions into two stages. In the second stage, within-period decision is the
same as the static collective model for a single period.
2.4.1 The Basic setting
Preferences and household problem
Consider a two-member household consisting of a husband (m) and a wife (f). Let
hfit and h
m
it denote f and m’s labor supply, between 0 and 1 for household i in period
t. Let cfit and c
m
it denote f and m’s individual consumption of a private Hicksian
commodity. The price of the consumption good is set to 1. Assume no home produc-
tion, so that leisure and labor supply add up to 1.6 Assume individual preferences
are of “egotistic” type, so that utilities can be written as U jit(1 − hjit, cjit) (j = f,m),
where U jit is continuously differentiable, strictly monotone, strictly quasi-concave, and
inter-temporally additive-separable over the life cycle.7 The household problem is to
5I look at wage shocks instead of income shocks because the main component of income is labor
earnings, which are endogenous to labor supply.
6Most empirical studies using the collective model make this assumption because most datasets
that include labor supply information do not include home production.
7Chiappori (1992) shows that the main results for egoistic preference also hold in a more general
case of “caring” agents, whose preferences are represented by utility functions that depend on both
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choose labor supply, consumption, and savings, in order to maximize the discounted,
weighted, linear, social welfare function, subject to the household’s budget constraint:
max
hfit,c
f
it,h
m
it ,c
m
it ,Ai,t+1
E0[
T∑
t=1
βt−1(µitU f (1− hfit, cfit) + Um(1− hmit , cmit ))]
s.t.cfit + c
m
it + Ai,t+1 ≤ wfithfit + wmit hmit + yit + Ait ∀t
wfit = w
f
it + δ
f
it + ν
f
it, w
m
it = w
m
it + δ
m
it + ν
m
it
µit = f(w
f
it, w
m
it , yit, zit)
(2.1)
where wfit and w
f
it denote f and m’s hourly wage rate, respectively, in period t. Wage
contains three components: expected wages, wfit and w
m
it , which are perceived by both
partners; permanent shocks, δfit, δ
m
it , which are unexpected, but once the shocks occur,
both agents know the shocks will last for a long time; transitory shocks, νfit and ν
m
it ,
which are also unexpected, but both partners know these influences are temporary.8
Ait denotes net wealth in period t − 1, and yit denotes non-labor income, which
includes asset income and transfers.910 The non-negative scalar µit defines the wife’s
decision weight within the household. In the existing collective models, µit depends
on both of the partners’ wages, non-labor income, and some distribution factors that
affect the outside environment of the household (Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix 2002).
Underlying the function µit, there exists some intra-household allocation mechanism.
their egoistic utility and their spouses’. I focus on egoistic preferences only. Each individual may
care about the overall welfare of their partner, but not by the way in which this welfare is generated.
8An example would be, when the husband gets an unexpected injury, both he and his spouse
knows whether the injury is going to persist for a long time or will recover very soon.
9Interest income rtAit is already included in yit, by definition.
10I do not explicitly introduce shocks to the non-labor income. In this model, I assume couples
pool non-labor income and decide how to divide it according to the sharing rule, which is what most
existing studies using collective models assume. Given this assumption of non-labor income pooling,
shocks to non-labor income and the non-stochastic non-labor income enter the decision weight hence
the sharing rule in the same manner. Therefore, people share risks to non-labor income in the exact
same way as they share non-labor income.
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In my model, since wages are subject to stochastic fluctuations, these shocks also affect
the household allocation outcome, the main channel of intra-household insurance of
interest in this paper.
Two-Stage decision process
To solve the household problem in equation (2.1) and uncover how couples share
risks and resources, I apply theory from the collective model derived by Chiappori
(1988, 1992), and the extended results by Blundell et al. (2007) and Donni (2003),
which allow for corner solutions, to decentralize household decisions into individual
decisions. I also apply the two-stage budgeting of Blundell and Walker (1986), to
separate inter-temporal savings decisions from within-period labor supply and con-
sumption decisions, so that decentralization in the multi-period environment can still
hold.
The static collective model by Chiappori (1988, 1992) has shown that under
the assumption of Pareto efficiency with egoistic preferences, according to the Second
Welfare Theorem, a weighted maximization of household utility functions can be
decentralized, given a lump sum income transfer (sharing rule). In the first stage, the
household members decide jointly how to allocate pooled resources to each individual,
usually non-labor income, according to a sharing rule. In the second stage, given the
allocated non-labor income, each agent chooses individual consumption and leisure
by maximizing individual utility subject to his or her earnings plus the amount of the
non-labor income that is allocated to him or her. However, when extending the static
collective model into a dynamic context, an inter-temporal savings decision with a
corner solution to labor supply makes decentralization no longer feasible. Mazzocco
(2004) develops a two-period collective model with income shocks. His model treats
income as exogenous; hence the model does not incorporate labor supply decisions. To
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the best of my knowledge, Mazzocco and Yamaguchi (2006) are the only researchers
who develop a dynamic collective model with endogenous labor supplies and corner
solutions. They consider three discrete choices of labor supply: full-time, part-time,
and non-participation, while, in this paper, I consider the continuous hours’ choice.
I also allow the household decision weight to depend on wage shocks. Mazzocco and
Yamaguchi (2006) simulate a model to capture the empirical features of labor supply,
savings, and marital choices. Although marital status and the commitment issue
affect labor supply and savings decisions, I focus on intact families only, to study
their joint decisions, in response to each other’s wage shocks. Marriage decision is
beyond the scope of this paper and is left to future research.
I apply the theory developed in Blundell and Walker (1986), to separate the
inter-temporal savings decision from the within-period labor supply decision. An
inter-temporally separable life-cycle model under uncertainty can be viewed as a two-
stage budgeting process: in the first stage, the household optimally allocates full life-
cycle wealth over each period, to equalize marginal utility of income across periods,
and readjusts wealth according to realized shocks in the previous period. In the
second stage, the current period’s allocation of income, net of savings, is distributed
between consumption and leisure; thus, the second stage becomes a within-period
decision.11 Therefore, the theory derived in the single-period collective model can
be applied in this second stage, which involves only within-period consumption and
the leisure decision, under the assumption that the decision is within-period Pareto
efficient.
Incorporating both collective models of decentralization and Blundell and Walker’s
(1986) separation of savings and labor supply decisions, I specify a two-stage collec-
11Blundell and Walker’s (1986) model is based on single decision-maker households, but it can
be applied to collective models (Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix 2002, Blundell et al. 2007).
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tive decision process as follows: at the beginning of a marriage, a husband and wife
optimally allocate expected life-cycle wealth in each period according to their ex-
pectations of future shocks, and they agree upon a sharing rule to allocate future
resources, conditional on both partners’ wage shocks in each period. Given a savings
decision in the first stage, the second stage involves only within-period consumption
and leisure choices: once shocks are realized, conditional on the savings decision in
the first stage, the husband and wife allocate non-labor income, net of savings, ac-
cording to the realized sharing rule, and each agent chooses private consumption and
labor supply, subject to earnings, plus their share of non-labor income:
max
hjit,c
j
it
U jit(1− hjit, cjit)
s.t. cjit ≤ (wjit + δjit + νjit)hjit + φjit j = f,m ∀t
φfit = φit, φ
m
it = yit − sit − φit
(2.2)
where φfit is the amount of non-labor income, net of savings, allocated to the wife,
and φmit is the remaining amount, allocated to the husband. sit is the active savings
in period t.
Without corner solutions, the second-stage problem in equation (2.2) can be
solved from first-order conditions. Marshallian labor supply can be derived as a
function of one’s own wage plus the amount of non-labor income that is assigned to
him or her:
hfit = h
f
it(w
f
it + δ
f
it + ν
f
it, φit)
hmit = h
m
it (w
m
it + δ
m
it + ν
m
it , yit − sit − φit)
(2.3)
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Sharing rule
In this section, I specify a sharing rule that allows for intra-household insurance for
permanent and transitory wage shocks. Sharing rules in existing collective models
are assumed to depend on non-labor income, each individual’s wage, and distribution
factors which influence household decision weight without affecting preferences. This
paper aims to examine how shocks affect a household’s joint decisions and how long-
run shocks and short-term shocks affect joint decisions differently. Therefore, I allow
permanent shocks and transitory shocks of both agents to enter the sharing rule.
Wage shocks not only affect one’s own labor supply through budget constraint by
the standard income and substitution effect, but they also affect spousal labor supply
through this sharing rule. I specify the sharing rule to be a function of husbands’ and
wives’ expected wage, permanent shocks, transitory shocks, pooled income - which is
non-labor income net of savings - and a vector of distribution factors z. The outcome
comes from this sharing rule could be larger than the total amount of non-labor
income, net of savings, in which case the husband not only transfers all the non-labor
income, but also transfers part of his own earnings to the wife. This sharing rule can
also be a negative value, in which case the wife transfers some of her earnings to the
husband.
φit = φ(yit − sit, wfit, wmit , δfit, δmit , νfit, νmit , zit) (2.4)
This sharing rule allows expected wages, unexpected permanent wage shocks, and
unexpected transitory wage shocks to affect intra-household allocation differently.
The expected wages are the wage component that caught much attention in the
existing static collective model (Blundell et al., 2007), under the assumption that
changes in this non-stochastic wage component may affect the bargaining position
in the household. In my model, I allow unexpected shocks to affect the sharing
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rule in a different way than the expected wage, as the response to shocks reflects
intra-household insurance, i.e., how couples share the risks. Furthermore, I also
allow permanent shocks and transitory shocks to affect intra-household insurance
differently. As noted in the introduction, existing studies on insurance against income
shocks provide mixed evidence on whether there exists more insurance to permanent
shocks or transitory shocks. The estimation of this model provides new evidence on
this long-debated question.
The sharing rule is not only affected by the characteristics within the house-
hold, but is also likely to be affected by outside environment, the distribution factors.
I specify local sex ratio and divorce law index as two distribution factors, as in Chiap-
pori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002). Local sex ratio is also used in Lise and Seitz (2007)
and Choo et al. (2008) to measure the marriage market tightness. Such distribu-
tion factors do not affect household budget constraint or individual preferences, but
could affect their opportunities outside marriage therefore affect their decision weight
within the household.
Specification and identification of the sharing rules
Before discussing identification of the sharing rules, I specify functional forms for labor
supply and the sharing rule. As in most empirical studies with collective models, I
specify log-linear functional form for the Marshallian labor supplies in equation (2.3):
loghfit = α0 + α1logw
f
it + α2φit
loghmit = β0 + β1logw
m
it + β2(yit − sit − φit)
(2.5)
I do not impose the logarithm on the sharing rule, since, in theory, it could be negative:
when the wife transfers not only all non-labor income, but also some of her earnings.
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One limitation of this linear functional form is its lack of flexibility, since the labor
supply curve is monotonic. I specify a sharing rule to be a linear function in all its
arguments and include two distribution factors z1i and z2i:
φit = k0+k1(yit−sit)+k2wfit+k3wmit +k4δfit+k5δmit +k6νfit+k7νmit +k8z1i+k9z2i (2.6)
In Appendix 2.8.1, I show that labor supply functions in equation (2.5) imply the fol-
lowing indirect utility functions, from which one can perform intra-household welfare
analysis of changes in exogenous variables:
vf (wfit, φ
f
it) =
e−α2φ
f
it
α2
+
(wfit)
α1+1
α1 + 1
vm(wmit , φ
m
it ) =
e−β2φ
m
it
β2
+
(wmit )
β1+1
β1 + 1
(2.7)
Also in Appendix 2.8.1, by following propositions in Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel
(2007), I can derive the Pareto weight, in the planner’s problem (2.1), which is a one-
to-one mapping of the sharing rule in the decentralized problem (2.2). The Pareto
weight has the following form:
µit = e
α2+β2[(k0+(k1−1)(yit−sit)+k2wfit+k3wmit+k4δfit+k5δmit+k6νfit+k7νmit +k8z1i+k9z2i] (2.8)
This exponential expression in equation (2.8) ensures the decision weight to be always
a positive scalar, which is consistent with the theory. Wage shocks from both partners
also show up in the Pareto weight.
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Identification of the sharing rule when both partners work
From observed labor supply, it is possible to uncover the unobserved sharing rule, up
to an additive constant (Chiappori 1988, 1992). The intuition for identification is that
changes in non-labor income and the wife’s wage and shocks affect only the husband’s
labor supply, through the sharing rule, and vice versa. Substituting sharing rule (2.6)
into Marshallian labor supply functions (2.5), yields the corresponding reduced-form
labor supply functions, when both partners are working:
loghfit =a0 + a1(yit − sit) + a2wfit + a3wmit + a4δfit + a5δmit + a6νfit
+ a7ν
m
it + a8z1i + a9z2i
loghmit =b0 + b1(yit − sit) + b2wfit + b3wmit + b4δfit + b5δmit + b6νfit
+ b7ν
m
it + b8z1i + b9z2i
(2.9)
The partial derivatives of the sharing rule are derived as a function of the reduced-
form labor supply parameters:
k1 =
a1b8
∆
, k2 =
a8b2
∆
, k3 =
a3b8
∆
, k4 =
a8b4
∆
, k5 =
a5b8
∆
k6 =
a8b6
∆
, k7 =
a7b8
∆
, k8 =
a8b8
∆
, k9 =
a9b8
∆
(2.10)
where ∆ = a1b8−b1a8. Only the constant k0 in the sharing rule is not identified. The
within-period Pareto efficiency assumption also generates the following restrictions:
a8
a9
=
b8
b9
(2.11)
a8
b8
=
a4 − a2
b4 − b2 =
a5 − a3
b5 − b3 =
a6 − a2
b6 − b2 =
a7 − a3
b7 − b3 (2.12)
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Equation (2.11) is a standard restriction in the existing collective models. The intu-
ition of this restriction is that, since the distribution factors only affect both agents’
labor supply, through the sharing rule, the effect of distribution factor z1i versus z2i
on wives is proportional to the effect of z1i versus z2i on husbands. Equation (2.12)
is a specific restriction in my model. Since I decompose wage into three components
(expected wage, permanent shocks, and transitory shocks), the model generates ad-
ditional restrictions than standard collective models, which do not distinguish these
three components.
Identification of the sharing rule when one of the partners does not work
The model described thus far does not involve corner solutions. This paper not only
looks at how couples insure each other’s wage shocks when both of them are working,
but also considers how one agent adjusts his/her work hours when their spouse does
not work. I focus on the case where the wife works but the husband does not, which
is the case that “added worker effect” literature focuses on.12
Donni (2003) and Blundell et al. (2007) have shown that the sharing rule
changes when male labor market participation changes. The intuition for switching
the sharing rule is as follows: when the husband works, his wage affects both house-
hold budget constraint and the sharing rule; when he does not work, his expected
wage can still be observed, and while it no longer has any impact on household budget
constraint, it can still have an impact on the sharing rule. Note that this is a crucial
difference between the collective model and the alternative unitary model, where a
household can be viewed as a single decision-maker, and the weight does not depend
on prices, such as wage. In the unitary model, when a household member is not
12The reason why I focus on the male participation frontier instead of both is mainly due to
statistical incoherency, which will be explained in section 2.4.3.
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working, changes in his or her “potential” wage, or expected wage, do not matter.
However, in the collective setting, the expected wage of an unemployed member could
affect bargaining positions, such as threat point.
Identification of the sharing rule when one of the partners is not working is
possible via an examination of female continuous hours’ choice and the male partici-
pation corner. Donni (2003) and Blundell et al. (2007) deal with non-participation in
the static collective labor supply models. Blundell et al. (2007) estimate the model
when men have only a discrete choice of working 40 hours a week or not working
at all, while women can choose continuous hours. Donni (2003) develops the theory,
allowing both household members to choose any hours and, also, to choose not to
work. In this paper, I apply collective theory from Donni (2003). Both Donni (2003)
and Blundell et al. (2007) show that the reservation wage is characterized by “double
indifference”: at the wage when one agent is indifferent between working and not
working, Pareto efficiency of household decisions requires that the spouse must be
indifferent as well.13 Both studies also derive restrictions that ensure the uniqueness
of a pair - of the husband and wife’s reservation wages.
In my model, when the husband is not working, the sharing rule no longer
depends on the husband’s transitory wage shocks, but still depends on his expected
wage and permanent wage shocks, as well as on all three of his wife’s wage components.
For example, when the husband receives a negative wage shock of either $100 or $1,
as long as both shocks drive his wage below the reservation wage, he stops working.
These two shocks are not separately identified and would have the same effect on
the sharing rule. Thus, the sharing rule does not depend on how large the husband’s
transitory wage shock is, it only depends on the fact that this shock drives him to stop
13Suppose not: if the wife is indifferent between working or not, but her participation yields
a positive gain for her spouse, then she will choose to participate, otherwise the decision is not
Pareto-optimal.
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working. When the husband is not working, his expected wage is still assumed to be
observable by the economist, as, in practical terms, wages can generally be estimated
by an auxiliary equation. Furthermore, as long as the husband is not unemployed for
the entire period, his permanent shocks from other periods, while he is working, can
also be observed.
Denote the sharing rule in the male non-participation set as φNPit and denote
parameters with upper case:14
φNPit = K0+K1(yit−sit)+K2wfit+K3wmit +K4δfit+K5δmit +K6νfit+K7z1i+K8z2i (2.13)
As Marshallian labor supply is a function of one’s wage rate and the sharing rule,
this also suggests that reduced-form labor supply switches as well:15
loghfit =A0 + A1(yit − sit) + A2wfit + A3wmit + A4δfit + A5δmit + A6νfit + A7z1i + A8z2i
(2.14)
Define female labor supply as hfNPit , when the male is working. Donni (2003) shows
the following continuity condition must hold:
hfNPit = h
f
it + sh
m
it (2.15)
where s is a scalar that can be estimated. Along the male participation frontier,
the last term in (2.15) equals zero. Consequently, hfNPit = h
f
it, which implies that
female labor supply is continuous. The sharing rule also follows a similar continuity
14Notice that the sharing rule on the male non-participation set does not depend on the husband’s
transitory shocks, which means the coefficient on transitory shocks is zero.
15Since the sharing rule does not depend on the husband’s transitory shocks, female labor supply,
as a function of the wife’s wage plus the amount of non-labor income originating from the sharing
rule, also does not depend on the husband’s transitory shocks.
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condition:
φNPit = φit + qh
m
it (2.16)
This suggests that the sharing rule is also continuous along the participation frontier.
A Pareto-efficient decision implies that there is no discrete jump in the amount of non-
labor income that the wife receives when there is a discrete jump in the husband’s
participation. The relation between s and q can be derived from equations (2.6),
(2.11) and (2.12):
q =
sb8
∆
(2.17)
Parameters Ks, which are the partial derivatives of the sharing rule on the male non-
participation set, can be identified via (2.18) and (2.19). Only the constant K0 is not
identified.
2.4.2 The unitary model
In previous sections, I derive restrictions that labor supply functions should satisfy
under the collective setting. The alternative household decision model, the unitary
model, assumes that the household is the primary decision unit, as opposed to in-
dividuals themselves. Additionally, with this model, a household behaves like an
individual to maximize utility, which does not depend on prices such as wages or
non-labor income. Two restrictions are imposed on the unitary model: income pool-
ing restriction and Slutsky restrictions. The income pooling restriction suggests that
household members pool income together, which fully insure themselves against all
shocks. The other restriction is the Slutsky symmetry of the substitution matrix and
positive semi-definiteness of the substitution matrix. The unitary model generates
different testable restrictions from the collective model. As in the previous setting,
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I also assume households make savings decisions in the first stage, and the second
stage involves only within-period consumption and labor supply decisions.
max
hfit,h
m
it ,c
f
it,c
m
it
U(1− hfit, 1− hmit , cfit, cmit )
s.t. cfit + c
m
it ≤ wfithfit + wmit hmit + yit − sit ∀t
(2.18)
Labor supply functions can still be derived as in equation (2.9). Slutsky symmetry
implies the following restriction:
b8 = −a8 (2.19)
Another restriction for the unitary model comes from participation decisions. In the
collective model, when the husband does not work, his potential wage still affects the
sharing rule. It therefore affects labor supply as well. In the unitary model, this effect
no longer exists. This implies that the effect of male potential wage on female labor
supply is zero, when the husband is not working:
A3 = 0⇒ a3 + sb3 = 0 (2.20)
2.4.3 Further discussions of the model
Given the specifications of the model, it is worth discussing the restrictions it im-
poses. First, this model does not consider marriage or divorce decisions, while a large
adverse shock from one partner may lead to divorce. Thus, my estimation uses the
most committed families, which would overestimate individuals’ willingness to in-
sure against spouse’s shocks in the population. Second, this model only distinguishes
shocks at different persistency levels, but does not distinguish shocks from different
causes, such as wage loss from injury or job transition. These, however, could have
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different impacts on labor supply.16 Third, this model implicitly assumes agents can
adjust labor supply freely. In reality, though, hours might be constrained for a given
job, and, since it takes time to find another job, the labor-supply adjustments by
switching jobs might not be reflected in the current period. Therefore, empirical
work might underestimate the effect of wage shocks on labor supply. Fourth, I as-
sume that there is no external insurance for wage shocks. Hence I do not consider
the interaction between social insurance programs such as an unemployment benefit
and intra-household insurance. Adding external insurance will result in an adverse
selection problem.17 Last but not least, one implicit assumption is that couples have
the same preference for risk, as husbands and wives have the same utility functions.
Preferences for risks, however, could be a factor that influences couples’ willingness
to insure. For instance, couples who are more risk averse may be more likely to insure
each other’s transitory shocks to smooth consumption, or if a husband and wife have
different preferences for risk, they may respond to spousal shocks differently. Maz-
zocco (2004) considers savings decisions and finds that household members transfer
more to the agent that is more risk averse.
Notwithstanding these limitations, given the ability of the model to capture
the intra-household insurance from spouses’ joint labor supply decisions, together
with its tractability and flexibility, it is useful to analyze the link between income
volatility and household decisions. Above discussions also suggest some interesting
avenues for future research.
16Coile (2003) studies how health shocks affect married couples’ labor supply decisions.
17There are some other studies that examine how external insurance affects labor supply. Cullen
and Gruber (2000) show that a generous unemployment benefit has a crowding out effect on spousal
labor supply.
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2.5 Data and empirical results
2.5.1 Data
This study uses the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 2001 panel,
a national representative longitudinal dataset in the United States For the study of
short-run labor supply response to wage changes, SIPP offers substantial advantage
over other panel data sets, such as PSID or the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
First, SIPP interviews three times a year, while other data sets conduct interviews
either annually or biennially.18 Thus, SIPP provides high frequency labor supply
fluctuation.19 Another advantage of SIPP is that high frequency interviews also yield
better quality of wage information. With annual interviews, it is not possible to obtain
wage changes for jobs that last for less than a year. In PSID, if a job change occurs
some time during the year, then wages computed from annual earnings and hours
are the mixture of wages on the new and the old jobs. SIPP directly reports hourly
wage for hourly-wage employees. Further, I use wage data purged of measurement
error, as in Gottschalk (2005).20 Under the assumption that nominal wages adjust in
discrete steps while working for the same employer, Gottschalk (2005) identifies the
structural breaks in individual wage series and separates the effect of measurement
error from that of true changes in wages.
The SIPP 2001 panel consists of nine waves, from December 2000 to Febru-
ary 2003. The primary sample cuts in the estimation include married couples with
husbands 20-64 years old and wives younger than 64 years old, at some point in the
18In addition, HRS only contains sample of older people.
19SIPP also contains monthly data on wage and labor supply. But monthly data has the well-
documented seam bias problem (Gottschalk 2005). Respondents are more likely to report a wage
change between interviews instead of within an interview period.
20I thank Peter Gottschalk for generously providing SIPP wage data with his correction of mea-
surement error.
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panel. Excluded are households who have children less than 18 years old, because the
model does not account for home production or public consumption, which is likely
to change with the number of children. This yields a sample of 8,417 households with
51,112 observations. All income variables are placed into January 2000 Consumer
Price Index Research Using Current Methods Series (CPI-U-RS) dollars.21
The dependent variable is the total number of hours of work in each wave
(three months). The measure of wage is hourly wage rate, defined as the observed
hourly wage for hourly-wage employees, or, alternatively, as the total wage earnings
divided by the number of hours of work. Household non-labor income includes prop-
erty income, transfer income, and other income. Savings is constructed by taking
the difference between net wealth in period t and t-1.22 Information on net wealth is
available only in the 3rd, 6th and 9th wave of the SIPP 2001 panel. I use linear inter-
polation to fill in for the remaining waves.23 This variable is treated as endogenous
with the measurement error in the empirical section.
The local sex ratio is constructed using the 2000-2003 American Community
Survey (ACS) from the Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS). It corresponds to
the number of unmarried males of the same age as the husband in each household
divided by the number of unmarried males and unmarried females of the same age,
for each state and each one of the three racial groups (white, black, others). This sex
ratio represents the tightness of the local marriage market, under the assumption that
people married within their own racial group. I also experimented with alternative
definitions of sex ratio: the ratio including both married and unmarried individuals,
or the number of males divided by the number of males and females of the same age
21The deflator can be found at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income05/cpiurs.html
22I acknowledge that savings constructed by this method includes both active and passive savings,
as well as measurement error. Savings in my model refers to active savings only.
23The PSID data only contains wealth information every-other five years before 1996, and bien-
nially afterwards. The HRS data only includes wealth information every-other year, also.
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group (20-24, 25-29, etc.). The other distribution factor, divorce law index, considers
four of the following features of divorce legislation in each state: property division
(community property =1), mutual consent versus unilateral divorce (mutual consent
=1), contribution to education (=1), and non-monetary contribution (=1).24 These
features are likely to favor women. All four features did not change over time within
states, during my sample period. Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics. On
average, married women work less than men and earn lower hourly wage. Married
women’s wage variations and hours variations are higher than men. There are large
variations in household non-labor income. Savings variable has a very large noise.
2.5.2 Estimates of the permanent and the transitory wage
shocks
To study how wage shocks affect couples’ labor supply, it is crucial to obtain good
estimates of wage shocks. It is also important to distinguish between permanent
shocks and transitory shocks, as they are each likely to be determined by different
factors (change in skill prices versus job instability, for instance), and hence have
different impacts on household joint labor supply decisions. There is a large body of
literature that estimates income dynamics models (for a review see MaCurdy 2007).
The canonical error components model is as follows:
yit = µi + νit (2.21)
where yit is log income or residual log income for individual i in year t, µi is a time-
invariant permanent individual component and νit is a transitory component.
The model can be estimated using either nonparametric or parametric meth-
24From Family Law Quarterly, Winter 2000, Winter 2001, Winter 2002, Charts 4 and 5.
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ods. Earlier work by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) estimate the permanent compo-
nent of earnings as the average earnings for each individual over each 9-year window ,
and the deviations from the average as the transitory component. Such non-structural
approach is still used in recent studies of earnings dynamics (Beach et al., 2003, 2008).
Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002) use an alternative nonparametric model. Assume the
transitory shocks fade out if time period is long enough, they identify the permanent
variance as the covariance between two time periods, and identify the transitory vari-
ance as the difference between variance and covariances. Other studies specify formal
error components models, usually assuming the evolvement of the transitory shocks
follow a lower order ARMA process, and the permanent shocks are introduced by a
random walk or a random growth. From the estimated parameters one can compute
the permanent and transitory variances in each time period for each age cohort.
Using any of the above three methods one can estimate the variances of the
permanent and transitory shocks. However, to identify the individual shocks instead
of the variances of the shocks, we needs stronger identification assumptions. For
instance, from a formal error components model, it is impossible to uncover individual
random walk or random growth in the permanent component. I need to make a strong
assumption that the permanent component does not subject to a random walk or
random growth.
In this paper I use a modified version of the non-structural approach developed
in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994). Instead of assuming the permanent component
remain constant over time, I allow a linear growth in the permanent component.
logwjit = w
j
it + tµ
j
i + ν
j
it j = f,m (2.22)
where logwjit is the log hourly wage rate. w
j
it represents the expected wage, which is
66
predictable from observed education and age. tµji is the permanent wage shock and
νjit is the transitory wage shock.
I obtain wjit from the predicted value of first-stage Mincer regressions for each
period. The dependent variable is log wage rate, and the independent variables
include age, age square, four education dummies (high school diploma, some college,
college degree, graduate school) all with time-varying coefficients. These time varying
parameters are excluded in equation (2.9), thus they serve as the exclusion restrictions
for the labor supply equations. The intuition is that the differences in the preferences
and the sharing rule remain constant over time. The identification of labor supply
relies on the assumption that the returns to education have changed over time, but
such changes do not affect labor supply decisions. This assumption is consistent with
empirical studies on income inequality, such as the increasing wage premium between
college and high school degree (Katz and Autor 1999, among others).
Then, I identify the permanent and transitory shocks for each individual in each
time period by individual regressions. The identification comes from the assumption
that individual permanent component µji is time invariant, so it can be treated as a
fixed coefficient.
eˆjit = µ
j
i t+ ν
j
it j = f,m (2.23)
where t becomes an independent variable, and this regression produces the estimated
coefficient µˆji . The permanent shocks can be computed using the predicted value from
(2.23), and the transitory shocks are simply the difference between wage residuals and
permanent shocks.
The estimated permanent and transitory shocks are shown in Table 2.3. Women
have larger standard deviations and larger ranges between minimum and maximum,
in both permanent shocks and transitory shocks, than men do. This is consistent
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with the stylized facts from Table 2.1, that women’s wages are more volatile than
men’s wages.
2.5.3 Estimates of couple’s labor supply functions and the
sharing rules
In this section, I estimate labor supply functions for husbands and wives jointly, and
recover unobserved sharing rules. The sharing rule divides total non-labor income
net of savings from the first stage. Savings are treated as endogenous with the mea-
surement error. The savings variable is instrumented using the housing price index
interacted with home ownership and birth cohort dummies.25 Control variables in-
clude education dummies and a quadratic in age, for both partners.26 Table 2.4
shows estimates of savings regression. Predicted savings is used in the labor supply
functions.
The model in the theoretical section does not incorporate unobserved het-
erogeneity, since introducing unobserved heterogeneity with non-participation would
raise the issue of whether the model is identifiable from available data (Blundell et
al. 2007). Following existing studies using collective models with non-participation, I
specify labor supply functions with additives in the heterogeneity terms. Estimation
of household labor supply when both partners participate (equation 2.11) and female
labor supply when the husband does not work (equation 2.17) suggest a switching
25Lise and Seitz (2007) use similar instruments. Housing price index quarterly data, by state,
can be found at http://www.ofheo.gov/hpi download.aspx.
26In the data, savings information is noisy. In the regression, I use only the middle 90% observa-
tions, and predict for the entire sample.
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regression model:
loghf∗it = a
′xit + u
f
it + (1− I(hm∗it > 0))s(b′x+ umit )
loghm∗it = b
′xit + umit
(2.24)
where hj∗it (j = f,m) is a latent variable representing the desire to work. I(h
m∗
it > 0) is
an indicator for male participation. The same control variables are included in both
male and female labor supply functions: four education dummies and a quadratic
in age for both partners, race of head-of-household, and time dummies. ufit and u
m
it
are unobserved preference shocks to leisure, and I allow them to be correlated and
follow a joint normal distribution. The male participation condition is summarized
as follows:
loghmit =
 logh
m∗
it if logh
m∗
it > 0
= 0 otherwise.
(2.25)
Equations (2.24) and (2.25) are estimated using Full Information Maximum Likeli-
hood (FIML). The likelihood function is given in Appendix 2.8.2.
The above econometrics model allows me to derive the sharing rule when the
husband is not working. Theoretically, I can also jointly estimate a third sharing rule
where the wife is not working. However, in the empirical estimation, a simultaneous
regime-switching model generates a statistical coherency problem. Suppose I have
the simultaneous regime-switching model as follows:
loghf∗it = a
′xit + u
f
it + (1− I(hm∗it > 0))s(b′x+ umit )
loghm∗it = b
′xit + umit + (1− I(hf∗it > 0))S(a′x+ ufit)
(2.26)
Consider two cases: hf∗it > 0, h
m∗
it < 0 and h
f∗
it < 0, h
m∗
it > 0. When s < 0 and
S < 0, both these two cases hold. In reality, however, these two situations are mutu-
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ally exclusive. Bloemen (2004) also discusses that, without any further restrictions,
the double-switching model may generate multiple outcomes for the participation sta-
tus of a husband and wife in a household. Imposing coherency in such model is either
quite complicated or greatly reduces the generality of the model. Therefore, I only
focus on one participation frontier, in which the husband chooses whether or not to
work.
Estimates of the reduced-form supply functions
Table 2.5 presents FIML estimates of reduced-form female and male labor supply
functions. The standard errors have been computed using the bootstrap since ex-
pected wage, wage shocks and non-labor income are predicted. One’s wage shocks,
either permanent or transitory, have a significant negative effect on spousal labor
supply, while permanent shocks have a larger impact than transitory shocks. The
elasticity of husbands’ permanent wage shocks on wives’ labor supply is -0.158, while
transitory wage shocks have an elasticity of -0.075. A similar effect can be found in
the estimation of male labor supply functions: a 1% drop in the wife’s permanent
wage shock increases male labor supply by 0.216%, while the same drop in tran-
sitory shock increases male labor supply by 0.111%. This provides some evidence
that household members insure each other by increasing labor supply in response to
spousal adverse shocks, and such an insurance effect is stronger for more persistent
shocks. The estimate of ρ is -0.069, which suggests couples’ unobserved shocks to
leisure are negatively correlated.
Unlike wage shocks, the expected wage has a positive effect on spousal labor
supply. A 1% increase in male expected wage, due to the observed changes in age and
education, tends to increase female labor supply by 0.33%, while the same increase
in female expected wage tends to increase male labor supply by 0.22%.
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Recover the structural parameters and interpretation of the results
To see whether these empirical results are consistent with the collective hypothesis,
I test the restrictions implied by the collective model and the alternative unitary
model. Testing restrictions for the collective model are presented in equations (2.11)
and (2.12). The Wald statistic from a joint test is 1.20 with a p-value of 0.94, which
indicates that the collective hypothesis cannot be rejected at any conventional signif-
icant level. Testing the restrictions for the unitary model, equations (19) and (20),
yields a statistic of 12.88 and p-value of 0.002, which indicates that the unitary model
can be rejected at 1% level. The collective model cannot be rejected, while the uni-
tary model can be rejected. These test statistics provide support for the collective
hypothesis.
From the estimation of reduced-form labor supply functions, I recover the
Marshallian labor supply of equation (2.5), up to an additive constant. Table 2.6
presents female and male Marshallian labor supply estimates. The income effect is
precisely estimated for male labor supply, the negative sign suggests male leisure is
a normal good. Female income effect is also negative, but is not precisely estimated.
Both male and female own wage effects are significantly positive. The implied wage
elasticity is 0.893 for females and 3.003 for males. Both male and female Marshallian
labor supplies satisfy the Slusky condition of individual utility maximization.
Table 2.7 presents estimates of the two sharing rules: the first set of estimates
are when both partners work, the second is associated with when only the wife works
but the husband does not.27 Asymptotic standard errors are computed using the
delta method, based on the the bootstrapped standard errors from reduced from
27As discussed in Section 3.2.2, in the male non-participation set, male transitory wage shocks
are missing, thus the sharing rule φNPit does not depend on male transitory shocks. Permanent wage
shocks are also missing for those males who never work in the sample. For identification purposes,
the estimation only includes those who work at least two periods to identify the permanent shocks.
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regressions. Some of the parameters are not precisely estimated. From equation
(2.10), we can see that each parameter in the sharing rule relies on five parameters
from the reduced-form labor supply, and every sharing rule parameter depends on
the estimates of ∆ = a1b8 − b1a8. Furthermore, even if each coefficient is estimated
precisely, ∆ may still appear insignificant, especially when a1b8 and b1a8 have the
same sign.
When both partners are working, a household makes a greater transfer to the
agent with the larger adverse shocks, and makes the largest transfer to the agent
with shocks that are permanent. The first set of estimates of the sharing rule in
Table 2.7, together with estimates of the Marshallian labor supply in Table 2.6, can be
interpreted as follows: when the wife’s hourly permanent wage goes down by 10%, her
share of non-labor income from intra-household allocation increases by $380, which
means that the husband’s share of non-labor income decreases by the same amount.
Now, combined with the sharing rule estimates, the coefficient of non-labor income
on male log hours is -0.005, which suggests that a drop of $380 in the husband’s share
of non-labor income will translate into an increase in his labor supply of 1.9%. In
short, a 10% permanent shock to the wife’s hourly wage results in an increase of 1.9%
in the husband’s labor supply. The estimates of the sharing rule provide insights on
how shocks affect intra-household allocation, and the estimates of the Marshallian
labor supply provide insights on how that intra-household transfer translates into the
changes in spousal labor supply. When the shocks are transitory, the same shocks to
the wife’s labor supply result in a drop in the husband’s share of non-labor income
of $195, which, in turn, increases his labor supply by 0.98%. All these effects are
precisely estimated. I also test whether a wife’s permanent and transitory shocks
have the same effect on intra-household allocation. Although the wife’s permanent
wage shocks have a larger effect on intra-household insurance than do transitory wage
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shocks, such effect is not statistically significant.
Now let us look at the reverse, that is, how husbands’ permanent and transitory
shocks affect wives’ labor supply through intra-household transfer. When there is a
10% negative permanent shock to the husband’s wage, the wife’s share of non-labor
income drops by $664, the wife’s labor supply increases by 1.3%. Given the same
transitory shocks to the husband’s wage, the wife’s share of non-labor income drops
by $314.5, wife’s labor supply increases by 0.6%. Unfortunately, these effects are not
precisely estimated. Compared to previous results of male labor-supply response to
female wage shocks, here female labor supply responds less to male wage shocks. But
it is not clear whether this is due to the imprecise estimates of some parameters.
The increase of female expected wage or the decrease of male expected wage, on
the other hand, increases the proportion of household pooled income allocated to the
wife. This result is also found in the collective labor supply estimation in Blundell
et al. (2007). Their interpretation is that higher wage increases one’s bargaining
power within the household, thus the individual could obtain more resources from
intra-household allocation. However, this effect is not precisely determined.
The sharing rule for a working wife with a non-working husband is quite dif-
ferent from the rule for working couples. This is partly due to the large value of the
estimate of q in equation (2.16). When the wife receives an adverse shock, no matter
whether it is permanent or transitory, her share of household non-labor income no
longer increases. The intuition behind this result is that now the husband is not able
to adjust his labor supply. Therefore, even if the wife has adverse shocks, the husband
cannot provide insurance through labor supply, thus she has to insure against this
shock by herself. The estimate of this sharing rule also indicates that there is no
evidence of the added worker effect. Added worker effects in my model would suggest
that when the husband becomes unemployed, the wife works more, to compensate for
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his income loss, such as his permanent shocks. This is contrary to what the sharing
rule shows. However, the estimates of this sharing rule are not significant, even at
the 10% level, partly due to the insignificant estimates of q. The coefficient estimate
of non-labor income has a value of 1.428, which is outside the usual range of between
0 and 1, as this represents a dollar increase of non-labor income, i.e., how much of
the increase goes to the wife.
The distribution factors do not have the expected sign on the sharing rule.
Increase in the local sex ratio (the relative scarcity of women) and changes in the
divorce law - in favor of women, should increase the female share of non-labor income,
but I find either no significant effect or the opposite sign. Alternative measurements
of sex ratio, such as compute ratio by dividing into four racial groups instead of
three, or measuring the number of men divided by the number of men plus women
within a 5 to 10 year age range, or measuring the number of all males over all males
and females, including both married and unmarried population, do not change the
results qualitatively. One possible explanation is, it maybe not the sex ratio at the
current period that affects intra-household allocation, instead, the sex ratio at the
time of marriage matters, since that is the time when they agree upon a sharing rule.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to back up the sex ratio at the time of marriage from the
available data. This unexpected sign for distribution factors is also found in Hourriez
(2005). He argues that such an effect may be a consequence of home production.
When the wife’s options outside marriage improve, she may want to negotiate both
the share of non-labor income and a reduction in her housework. This explanation is
also compatible with results in Table 2.7. Increased scarcity of women decreases the
male share of non-labor income when the husband participates in the labor market, as
couples may bargain over housework. The higher bargaining power the husband has,
the more he can negotiate to do less of the housework; therefore he might increase
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his labor supply. When the husband does not participate, such an effect of the sex
ratio on the sharing rule is no longer significant. This might be due to the fact that
the husband devotes zero hours on market work, and therefore his time on home
production is almost fixed. As a result, the wife does not need to negotiate over
home production, but only on intra-household allocation. This may be why I find a
positive effect of distribution factors on the sharing rule when the husband does not
participate in the labor market.
2.5.4 Comparison with the deterministic model
This paper introduces permanent and transitory wage shocks into the sharing rule of
the collective model. Here, I estimate the baseline model in the existing collective
literature, which does not distinguish between the deterministic component of wage
and its stochastic shocks. Table 2.8 displays sharing rule estimates that treat wage
as a single component, given everything else the same as in my main sample and
method. When both partners are working, female and male wage still have the
bargaining effect on the sharing rule, which is consistent with many studies using
collective models (Blundell et al, 2008, etc.). The wage effect is not statistically
significant though. Divorce law index now have the expected positive sign, but are
still not precisely estimated. I also estimate the model using the sample of working
couples only, which is the sample defined in Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002).
The results are still similar as in Table 2.8.
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2.5.5 Individual income volatility and intra-household allo-
cation
Previous sections examined how married couples adjust labor supplies in response
to each other’s wage shocks. Another question of interest is how they adjust labor
supplies in response to each other’s individual income volatility, which is measured
as the variances of the wage shocks for each individual. The analysis in this section
suggests that individual income volatility can be considered as a measurement of price
for intra-household insurance.28
Table 2.9 displays estimates of sharing rules including individual variance of
wage shocks. Permanent shocks and transitory shocks still affect the sharing rule in
the same direction as in Table 2.7. The point estimates show that one’s higher indi-
vidual wage volatility results in a lower proportion of non-labor income allocated to
him or her. My interpretation is such individual income volatility can be considered
as a measure of price for insurance. Take female volatility as an example, if her in-
come is very volatile, she has extra gain from the marriage by getting intra-household
insurance against her volatile income, compared to insuring all by herself if she re-
mained single. A possible consequence is, she needs to compensate her spouse by
transferring some of her income as a price for such insurance. This is reflected in the
estimation of the sharing rule that she transfers more income to her husband when
her income is more volatile. This result, from another perspective, provides evidence
in support of intra-household insurance.
28Note that, in Section 2.2, regarding stylized facts, income volatility is estimated using the entire
sample. Here, wage volatility is computed at the individual level. These are two different notations
and that is why I call the latter one “individual wage volatility”.
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2.5.6 Robustness checks and estimation for subgroups
I estimate the main model using several alternative specifications. I further restrict
the sample to include only those households with heads between 35 and 64 years old,
since this age range would typically be less likely to have children, or their children
would have already left home. The qualitative results do not change. I also try to
estimate the model using the sample of hourly workers only. This eliminates the
measurement error caused by imputed wage from earnings for those who earned a
salary on an annual basis. Unfortunately, the parameters are very poorly estimated,
mainly because of the very small sample size. In SIPP data, the flag for imputed wage
has many missing values, and when the sample is restricted to both partners who are
hourly workers, it only yields a pool of 886 households, while the main sample contains
4,749 households. Overall, these specification checks show that the main results are
robust to various specifications and sample cuts.
I also look at intra-household insurance for certain subgroups of the sample,
such as households with low wealth or low education. When households have lim-
ited access to borrowing and cannot adjust savings to insure against income shocks,
household members may be more likely to adjust labor supply to smooth consump-
tion. Such liquidity constraints are difficult to measure and also have an endogeneity
problem. Therefore, I do not measure liquidity constraints directly, but look at the
subgroups that might have liquidity problems, to see how their behavior differs from
the main sample. Garcia-Escribano (2004) uses data from PSID and finds that wives’
labor response to transitory shocks in husbands’ earnings is larger for households with
limited access to credit. Dynarski and Gruber (1997) use data from the PSID and
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and find that the sample drawn from the PSID
response of spousal labor supply is insignificant. In the CEX sample, though, wives’
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labor response is not significant for high school dropouts, but it is significant, and an
even larger effect, for higher-educated groups, which seems to contradict the liquidity
constraints theory.
Table 2.10 displays results of reduced-form labor supply estimation for house-
holds whose net wealth in the third wave is less than the 40th percentile.29 Table
2.11 displays estimation results for the two sharing rules. Reduced-form estimates
show that both the permanent and transitory shocks have significant effect on own
labor supply and spousal labor supply. Compared to reduced form estimates in Table
2.5, I find that shocks have slightly larger impacts on female labor supply for these
households with low wealth. Spousal wage shocks have larger effects on male labor
supply for low wealth households than the entire sample, while their own shocks have
smaller effects on male labor supply. In Table 2.11, parameters on sharing rules are
poorly estimated, thus they could not be compared with previous results using the
entire sample. I also estimate this model on households where the head-of-household’s
educational level was a high school diploma or below, or on households with a net
wealth less than the 50th percentile and who do not own a house or apartment. Re-
sults do not change qualitatively. These empirical findings are not exactly consistent
with the liquidity constraints theory, but many factors could explain these results:
People with lower wealth or lower education may have a lower ability to find jobs or
adjust their labor supply quickly. This also explains why couples with lower wealth
only respond to permanent shocks, but not to transitory shocks.
29I choose the third wave because this is the first wave where net wealth is observed instead of
interpolated.
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2.6 A structural explanation to the stylized facts
According to the stylized facts presented in Section 2.3, household earnings volatil-
ity is lower than individual earnings volatility for married couples, and household
earnings volatility for married couples, who might have an intra-household insurance
mechanism, are lower than that of singles who would not have an intra-household
insurance mechanism. To what extent do the results of my structural model provide
explanations to these empirical facts? In this section I conduct the following two
exercises: First, I recalculate transitory variances of log household earnings and log
individual earnings, given the structural responses of labor supply to both partner’s
transitory shocks from the model. Second, I calculate the same variances but without
any structural response of intra-household insurance, and compare the number with
the first exercise. The difference explains what proportion of earnings volatility is
due to intra-household insurance.
The estimation results of my model provide partial derivatives of labor supply
with respect to wage shocks. To take these structural responses into account, I use
Taylor expansion to derive earnings as a function of partial derivatives with respect
to husbands’ and wives’ wage shocks. Derivations are presented in Appendix 2.8.3.
Then, I calculate the variance of such expansions for log household earnings and indi-
vidual earnings. From expressions in equations (2.36) and (2.37) in Appendix 2.8.3,
the variances depend on parameters in the sharing rule and Marshallian labor supply
functions, estimates of transitory wage shocks, and observed labor supply. I plug es-
timated parameters, transitory shocks and labor supply into (2.36) and (2.37). Table
2.12 presents estimated earnings volatility from three sets of estimates: main results
as in Table 2.6-2.7; results including individual income volatility as in Table 2.10,
and estimates using working couples sample only. For the main results, log earnings
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volatility for married men is 1.547, which is higher than married couples’ household
earnings volatility, at 0.596. Log earnings volatility for married women is 0.414.
Therefore, household earnings volatility is much lower than the average of the hus-
bands’ and the wives’ earnings volatility. This lower household earnings volatility is
consistent with the stylized facts presented at the beginning of this paper. This is also
true for the other two alternative specifications. Using the working couples’ sample,
log household earnings volatility is even lower than the female earnings volatility.30
In the second exercise, I compute the transitory variance in log individual
or household earnings without intra-household insurance and compare this with the
previous results. Without intra-household insurance, wage shocks no longer affect
intra-household allocation. Therefore, the term k6, k7 becomes zero. For the main
specification, now the log individual earnings volatility is recalculated as 1.610 for
married men and 0.446 for married women, while married couples’ log household
earnings volatility becomes 0.603. Compared to the previous results with insurance,
this suggests that intra-household insurance to transitory shocks reduces household
earnings volatility by 1.2%. It also reduces individual earnings volatility by 4.1% for
married men and 7.7% for married women. These numbers may seem to be small,
but given the fact that the earnings volatility is mainly caused by fluctuations in
wages, such intra-household insurance already plays a significant role in explaining
the remaining earnings fluctuations. The magnitude is pretty similar in the other
two specifications. Both these exercises confirm that the model developed in this
paper provides empirical evidence that is consistent with the stylized facts: household
30The magnitude differs though. One difference is stylized facts in Table 1 includes all couples,
with and without children, while my estimation focus on the sample of couples without children.
Another reason for this difference is that in this exercise as well as in the model, I assume all wage
shocks are exogenous. The stylized facts from empirical data, however, also capture the possibility
that individual’s wage shock is a response to a spousal adverse wage shock. For instance, the wife
may switch to a job with a higher wage in response to her husband’s adverse wage shock, in which
case we observe the wife has a positive wage shock.
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earnings volatility is lower than individual earnings volatility, and earnings volatility
for those who have intra-household insurance mechanism are lower for those who do
not.
2.7 Conclusion
The literature on insurance for income shocks has either focused on consumption
smoothing via savings decisions, or focused on one-sided labor supply response. The
aim of this paper has been to evaluate the link between income volatility and house-
hold labor supply decisions, by examining the degree of intra-household insurance
with respect to each other’s wage shocks. I develop an intra-household insurance
model based on collective models, where wages are stochastic, and the intra-household
allocation depends on both permanent and transitory wage shocks. I first estimate
permanent and transitory wage shocks for each individual, then estimate couples’ la-
bor supplies, using the SIPP 2001 panel, and recover the unobserved intra-household
allocation mechanism. Estimation results provide some evidence of household insur-
ance via labor supply: married couples make joint labor-supply decisions to insure
against both permanent and transitory wage shocks, while labor response is larger
when shocks are permanent. Such household insurance disappears when the husband
becomes unemployed and can no longer adjust his labor supply. The negative effect
of individual income volatility on intra-household allocation can be considered as a
price for insurance. This paper also contributes to empirical studies using collective
models, by examining high-frequency data in the United States and expand the scope
of the sharing rule to act as a function of wage shocks, both permanent and transi-
tory. The comparison with existing static collective models shows the importance of
stochastic wage components and, therefore, the importance of developing formal dy-
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namic collective models with labor supply - both on extensive and intensive margin.
Furthermore, this model also has aggregate implications on individual and household
earnings volatility. The estimation of this model provides a structural explanation
for the stylized facts that household earnings volatility is lower than individual earn-
ings volatility, and how such intra-household insurance mechanism reduces household
earnings volatility and individual earnings volatility.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Proof of the existence of the Pareto weight
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2007) prove a dual representation of the household
problem. From their Proposition 1, there exists a shadow price vector and a scalar
valued sharing rule to solve the household problem in equation (2). By Proposition
2, given the shadow price vector and the sharing rule, there exists a Pareto weight
which can be written as a function of indirect utility functions and the sharing rule.
Let vf and vm denote indirect utility functions for the husband and wife. By Roy’s
identity:
∂vf (wfit, φ
f
it)/∂w
f
it
∂vf (wfit, φ
f
it)/∂φ
f
it
= hfit,
∂vm(wmit , φ
m
it )/∂w
m
it
∂vm(wmit , φ
m
it )/∂φ
m
it
= hmit (2.27)
First, from the Mashallian labor supply functions in equation (5), the differ-
ential equations above can be integrated out to obtain the following indirect utilities:
vf (wfit, φ
f
it) =
e−α2φ
f
it
α2
+
(wfit)
α1+1
α1 + 1
vm(wmit , φ
m
it ) =
e−β2φ
m
it
β2
+
(wmit )
β1+1
β1 + 1
(2.28)
By Proposition 2 in Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2007), the above indirect utility
functions imply the following Pareto weight:
µit = −∂v
m(wmit , φ
m
it )/∂φit
∂vf (wfit, φ
f
it)/∂φit
=
e−β2φ
m
it
e−α2φ
f
it
= e(α2+β2)φit−β2(yit−sit) (2.29)
Substituting φit with equation (6) we get:
µit = e
α2+β2[(k0+(k1−1)(yit−sit)+k2wfit+k3wmit+k4δfit+k5δmit+k6νfit+k7νmit +k8z1i+k9z2i] (2.30)
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2.8.2 Derivation of the likelihood functions
First, assume preference shocks ufit and u
m
it in labor supply functions follow a joint
normal distribution with zero mean and the following covariance matrix:
 σ2f ρσfσm
ρσfσm σ
2
m

The log-likelihood function takes the form:
L =
∑
i∈P
logLi(h
f
it, h
m
it ) +
∑
i∈NP
logLi(h
f
it) (2.31)
Likelihood function, when both partners are working, follows a joint normal distribu-
tion:
Li(h
f
it, h
m
it ) =
1
σfσm
ϕ(
ufit
σf
,
umit
σm
, ρ) (2.32)
where ϕ is standard normal distribution function. The likelihood function in the male
non-participation set NP is different. First, the covariance matrix becomes:
 σ2f + 2sρσfσm + s2σ2m ρσfσm + sσ2m
ρσfσm + sσ
2
m σ
2
m

Denote the first element in the above matrix as σv. The correlation parameter in this
covariance matrix becomes:
r =
ρσf + sσm
σv
(2.33)
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Let vi = r
σv
σm
umit +σv
√
1− r2ωit, where ωit is standard normal and independent of umit .
The likelihood in NP becomes:
∫ −b′x/σm
−∞
1
σm
ϕ(
um
σm
)
1
σv
√
1− r2ϕ(
hf − a′x− sb′x− r σv
σm
um
σv
√
1− r2 )∂u
m (2.34)
which can be simplified as:
Li =
1
σv
ϕ(
hf − a′x− sb′x
σv
)Φ(
− b′x
σm
− r hf−a′x−sb′x
σv√
1− r2 ) (2.35)
where Φ stands for the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribu-
tion.
2.8.3 Derivation of log earnings as function of both partners’
wage shocks
To write earnings as a function of the partial response to both partners’ wage shocks,
I use Taylor expansions. Based on the specification of the sharing rule in this model,
the higher order derivatives of labor supply respect to wage shocks all become zero.
First I present the first order Taylor expansion for log male earnings.
log(hmm) = f(logm, logf ) = log(hm0 
m
0 ) +
∂loghmm
∂logm
(logm − logm0 )
+
∂loghmm
∂logf
(logf − logf0)
(2.36)
where m and f are transitory shocks to male and female wage, respectively. logm
is equivalent to νm in my model (equation 21), as the wage decomposition is based
on log hourly wage rate. Take the variance of this log earnings, the constant terms
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drops out:
var(loghmm) = var(β1 − β2k7 + 1)logm − β2k6logf )
= var[(β1 − β2k7 + 1)νm − β2k6νf ]
(2.37)
Similarly, variance of log household earnings with first order Taylor expansion can be
derived as follows:
var(log(hmm + hff )) = var{ 1
hmm + hff
(hmm(β1 − β2k7 + 1) + hffα2k7)logm
+ (−hmmβ2k6 + hff (1 + α1 + α2k6)logf}
= var{ 1
hmexp(νm) + hfexp(νf )
(hmexp(νm)(β1 − β2k7 + 1)
+ hfexp(νf )α2k7)ν
m + (−hmexp(νm)β2k6 + hfexp(νf )
(1 + α1 + α2k6)ν
f}
(2.38)
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Figure 2.1: Transitory variances of log household earnings, log male earnings and
log female earnings in the United States, married households from PSID 1982-2002.
Adapted from Figure 6 in Zhang (2008)
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Table 2.1: Comparison of transitory variances for married and single agents
Variance in Transitory Component
Log Household Earnings Log Household Income
Single Males 0.174 0.152
Single Females 0.180 0.158
Married Couples 0.092 0.085
Singles (random match) 0.141 0.135
Log Wage Rate Log Earnings Log Hours
Single Males 0.044 0.174 0.036
Single Females 0.047 0.180 0.040
Married Males 0.058 0.169 0.041
Married Females 0.074 0.224 0.065
Note: Transitory variances are calculated as: var(it) = 1N
N∑
i
1
(Ti−1)
Ti∑
i
(yit−yi)2
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation
A. Women
Hours of work 417.6 342.8
Hourly wage 12.0 11.2
Age 41.1 10.2
Schooling 18.0 6.13
White 0.87 0.34
B. Men
Hours of work 690.6 284.6
Hourly wage 17.9 15.4
Age 43.3 10.3
Schooling 18.4 6.18
White 0.87 0.33
C. Household Characteristics
Property income 359.4 1733.7
Transfer income 53.8 483.7
Other income 978.6 2861.5
Savings 2,064.7 748,210
D. Marriage Market
Sex ratio 0.47 0.09
Divorce index 2.31 1.06
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Table 2.3: Summary of log wage decomposition
Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Female Expected Wage (wfit) 2.13 0.373 0.47 2.84
Male Expected Wage (wmit ) 2.63 0.310 1.54 3.23
Female Permanent Shocks (δfit) 0.0078 0.635 -16.15 4.34
Male Permanent Shocks (δmit ) 0.0017 0.602 -8.24 3.51
Female Transitory Shocks (νfit) -0.0025 0.419 -9.02 4.55
Male Transitory Shocks (νmit ) -0.0022 0.369 -8.77 4.06
Table 2.4: Estimates from savings equation
Coefficient Standard Error
House price 13.87*** 1.283
Birth cohort 1950 1,803.8*** 698.3
Birth cohort 1960 2,388.6** 1038.1
Birth cohort 1970 -422.0 1509.7
White 686.5 432.9
Age of husband -278.7 252.9
Age square of husband 1.98 2.68
Age of wife -96.7 174.5
Age square of wife 2.76 2.00
Note: (1)***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. (2)Other variables: age and
four education dummies for both partners and time dummies.
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Table 2.5: Reduced-form labor supply functions
Female Labor Supply Male Labor Supply
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Non-labor income net of savings -0.00028* 0.0002 -0.005*** 0.0007
Female expected wage 0.800*** 0.128 0.222 0.427
Male expected wage 0.325** 0.140 2.228*** 0.589
Female permanent shocks 0.308*** 0.012 -0.216*** 0.034
Male permanent shocks -0.158*** 0.014 1.398*** 0.053
Female transitory shocks 0.188*** 0.016 -0.111*** 0.035
Male transitory shocks -0.075*** 0.012 0.884*** 0.060
Local sex ratio 0.040 0.046 -0.094 0.133
Divorce law index -0.007 0.005 -0.045*** 0.014
Joint parameters
s 0.622*** 0.124
ρ -0.069*** 0.008
Note: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Standard errors are boot-
strapped.
Table 2.6: Marshallian labor supply functions
Female Labor Supply Male Labor Supply
logwfit 0.893*** logw
m
it 3.003**
(0.294) (1.547)
φit -0.002 yit − sit − φit -0.005***
(0.004) (0.001)
Note: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Asymptotic standard errors
are computed using delta method.
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Table 2.7: Estimates of the sharing rules
Both partners work Wife works, husband not
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Non-labor income (yit − sit) 0.117 0.197 1.428 2.31
Female expected wage (wfit) 39.06 76.02 -18.95 108.3
Male expected wage (wmit ) -136.2 229.0 -717.4 1168.6
Female permanent shocks (δfit) -37.97*** 12.04 18.42 98.7
Male permanent shocks (δmit ) 66.40 106.8 -298.4 486.9
Female transitory shocks (νfit) -19.50*** 8.16 9.46 50.85
Male transitory shocks (νmit ) 31.45 50.9 - -
Local sex ratio -16.6 20.9 8.05 52.5
Divorce law index -2.94 5.25 14.68 24.3
q - - -260.9 424.3
Note: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Asymptotic standard errors
are computed using delta method.
Table 2.8: Baseline sharing rules that do not distinguish wage and shocks
Both partners work Husband works, wife does not
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Non-labor income 0.044 0.124 1.85 4.31
Female wage 35.46 54.41 -31.4*** 165.0
Male wage -112.2 259.0 -512.3 1190.7
Local sex ratio -9.24 16.34 8.20 54.30
Divorce law index 0.671 2.18 6.22 15.00
q - - -189.9*** 447.2
Note: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Asymptotic standard errors
are computed using delta method.
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Table 2.9: Estimates of the sharing rules, including individual income volatility
Both partner works Husband works, wife not
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Non-labor income net of savings 0.126 0.101 1.518 0.950
Female expected wage 49.49 77.67 -29.34 70.08
Male expected wage -141.77 107.69 -755.3 502.1
Female permanent shocks -39.82*** 9.30 23.61 43.03
Male permanent shocks 71.62* 45.21 -324.8* 209.9
Female transitory shocks -20.38*** 6.64 12.08 22.60
Male transitory shocks 31.84* 20.06 - -
Female wage volatility -14.62* 9.09 8.67 21.07
Male wage volatility 6.46 11.40 -34.83 26.31
local sex ratio -11.64 21.99 11.65 30.57
divorce law index 3.43 3.39 -37.86 28.03
q - - -272.9 173.6
Note: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Asymptotic standard errors
are computed using delta method.
Table 2.10: Reduced-form labor supply function estimation for households with low
wealth
Female Labor Supply Male Labor Supply
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Nonlabor income net of savings -0.0003 0.0003 -0.003*** 0.0009
Female expected wage 0.520*** 0.134 0.149 0.317
Male expected wage -0.175 0.213 1.429** 0.635
Female permanent shock 0.324*** 0.022 -0.197*** 0.053
Male permanent shock -0.167*** 0.030 1.515*** 0.102
Female transitory shock 0.238*** 0.027 -0.102** 0.051
Male transitory shock -0.078*** 0.023 0.925*** 0.096
Local sex ratio -0.084 0.080 -0.528** 0.225
Divorce law index -0.017** 0.008 -0.043*** 0.019
Note: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Standard errors are computed
using bootstrap.
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Table 2.11: Estimates of the sharing rules for households with low wealth
Both partners work Wife works, husband not
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Non-labor income net of savings -1.63 7.01 -13.45 47.81
Female expected wage 150.7 524.6 826.6 3,300.3
Male expected wage -1,120.7 4,527.5 5,378.5 19,577.5
Female permanent shock -199.3 554.6 -1,093.3 3,719.4
Male permanent shock -1,065.2 3,784.2 5,823.9 20,767.8
Female transitory shock -103.2 291.4 -566.1 1,944.7
Male transitory shock -496.4 1,758.4 - -
Local sex ratio -535.0 1,552.0 -2,935.5 10,430.7
Divorce law index -106.3 385.9 -303.6 1,080.5
q - - 4,548.4 16,185.1
Note: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Asymptotic standard errors
are computed using delta method.
Table 2.12: Estimated transitory variances with and without insurance
log male earnings log female earnings log household earnings
Main model
With insurance 1.547 0.414 0.596
Without insurance 1.610 0.446 0.603
Percentage change 4.1 7.7 1.2
Including volatility
With insurance 1.600 0.405 0.610
Without insurance 1.669 0.435 0.618
Percentage change 4.3 7.4 1.3
Working couples
With insurance 0.236 0.587 0.216
Without insurance 0.242 0.611 0.219
Percentage change 2.5 7.0 1.4
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